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Abstract:	   At	   the	   heart	   of	   European	   integration	   lies	   a	   ‘Single	   Market’	   wherein	   production	   and	  trade	   across	   national	   borders	   take	   place	   relatively	   freely	   within	   the	   framework	   of	   EU-­‐wide	  legislation	  and	  policies.	  Although	  many	  actors	  and	  commentators	  reject	  the	  term,	  research	  has	  convincingly	  shown	  that	  many	  of	  these	  interventions	  in	  the	  economy	  amount	  to	  industrial	  policy	  in	   some	   shape	   or	   form.	   However,	   much	   less	   is	   known	   about	   the	   politics	   driving	   how	   these	  policies	  have	  been	  made	  and	   the	  orientations	   they	  have	   taken.	   Indeed,	   a	   lack	  of	  knowledge	   in	  this	  matter	  has	  been	  caused	  by	  failures	  to	  define	  precisely	  this	  very	  politics	  and,	  consequently,	  an	  absence	  of	  research	  which	  targets	  it	  directly.	  In	  seeking	  to	  escape	  from	  this	  analytical	  cul-­‐de-­‐
sac,	  this	  paper	  has	  two	  more	  specific	  aims.	  	  	  The	  first	  is	  to	  propose	  a	  sharp	  and	  operational	  definition	  of	  politics	  as	  being	  the	  mobilization	  or	  
suppression	  of	   values	   in	   order	   to	   change	  or	   reproduce	   the	   institutions	  which	   structure	   economic	  
activity.	   This	   definition	   has	   been	   derived	   from	   a	   melding	   together	   of	   constructivist,	  institutionnalist	  and	  Weberian	  theories	  and	  concepts.	  From	  empirically-­‐oriented	  constructivism	  an	   initial	  premise	  adopted	   is	   that	  we	   live	   in	  a	  world	  of	  contingency	  within	  which	  actors	  shape	  not	   only	   their	   own	   strategies,	   but	   also	   the	   very	   ‘problems’	   they	   seek	   to	   reduce,	   regularize	   or	  mediate.	   However,	   as	   historical	   and	   sociological	   institutionalism	   has	   convincingly	   shown,	   for	  such	  representations	  of	  reality	  to	  become	  ‘social’	  and	  thereby	  impact	  upon	  collective	  and	  public	  action,	  they	  have	  to	  be	  judged	  ‘appropriate’	  to	  changing	  or	  reproducing	  the	  ‘institutional	  orders’	  which	  structure	  societies,	  economies	  and	  polities.	  When	  studying	  such	  change	  or	  reproduction,	  adding	   Weberian	   sociology	   to	   this	   framework	   guides	   research	   to	   focus	   upon	   confrontations	  between	  values,	   i.e.	  beliefs	  about	  what	  is	   ‘good’	  or	   ‘bad’,	   that	   lie	  at	  their	  heart.	  Even	  within	  the	  constructivism	   and	   institutionalisms	   I	   draw	   upon,	   the	   role	   played	   by	   values	   is	   too	   often	  obscured	  by	  important,	  yet	  ultimately	  secondary,	  issues	  of	  argument	  and	  alliance-­‐making.	  	  	  The	   second	   aim	   of	   the	   paper	   is	   to	   test	   the	   heuristic	   value	   of	   this	   value-­‐centered	   approach	   to	  politics	  using	   two	   case	   studies	  of	  EU-­‐scale	   regulation:	  one	  of	   the	  pharmaceutical	   industry,	   the	  other	  of	  inter-­‐firm	  competition.	  As	  will	  be	  highlighted,	  focusing	  upon	  the	  role	  played	  by	  values	  during	  these	  instances	  of	  policymaking	  provides	  a	  means	  of	  revealing	  the	  key	  choices	  that	  have	  been	  made,	   the	   alternatives	   stifled	   and	   the	  patterns	  of	  domination	   that	  have	   resulted	  or	  been	  reproduced.	   In	   so	  doing,	   a	   further	  goal	  will	   be	   to	   go	   considerably	  beyond	  visions	  of	   the	  EU	   in	  general,	  and	  its	  economic	  policies	  in	  particular,	  as	  ‘neo-­‐liberal’	  and	  depoliticized.	  Although,	  many	  actors	  involved	  in	  this	  scale	  of	  government	  can	  be	  depicted	  in	  general	  terms	  as	  neo-­‐liberals	  and	  do	  indeed	  seek	  to	  technicize	  the	  making	  of	  EU	  policies,	  this	  tells	  us	  little	  about	  the	  fundamentally	  political	  content	  of	  their	  value	  systems.	  For	  both	  analytical	  and	  normative	  reasons,	  this	  politics	  simply	  must	  be	  researched	   then	  debated	  more	  directly	  and	  openly	   than	  European	  Studies	  has	  thus	  far	  been	  able	  to	  do.	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  This	  paper	  is	  the	  first	  draft	  of	  a	  chapter	  from	  a	  book	  provisionally	  entitled	  The	  Politics	  of	  Economic	  Activity.	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Introduction	  	  Those	  of	  us	  old	   enough	   to	   remember	   the	  period	  1985	  and	  1995	  when	   Jacques	  Delors	  was	  president	  of	  the	  European	  Commission,	  will	  probably	  recall	  the	  discourse	  that	  the	  EU	  is	  different	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  and,	  moreover,	  that	  being	  part	  of	  the	  EU	  makes	  a	  significant	  difference	  to	  its	  member	  states,	  public	  and	  private	  organizations	  and,	  above	  all,	   its	  citizens.	  As	  highlighted	  by	  research	  which	  documents	  not	  only	  Delors’	  speeches,	  but	  also	  his	  acts	  within	  and	  without	  the	  Commission	  (Ross,	  1995),	  representing	  the	  EU	  as	  different	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  has	  entailed	  emphasizing	  its	  quest	  to	  combine	  a	  single	   market	   with	   the	   retention	   of	   high	   levels	   of	   social	   protection.	   Using	   the	   terms	  deployed	   in	   this	   book,	   the	   declared	   aim	  was	   to	   conciliate	   the	   values	   of	   freedom	  with	  equality,	   and	   this	   as	   a	  means	  of	   enhancing	  both	   the	   security	  of	  European	   citizens	  and	  protecting	  their	  traditions.	  According	  to	  those	  who	  supported,	  and	  continue	  to	  support,	  Delors’	   project	   for	   the	  EU,	   this	   ordering	  of	   values	   is	  not	   only	   logically	   and	  practicably	  conciliable,	   it	   is	   precisely	   what	   makes	   the	   EU	   a	   well-­‐defended	   rampart	   against	  ‘globalization’	   by	   legitimizing	   a	   range	   of	   interventionist	   policies,	   and	   in	   particular	   the	  ‘economic	   policy’	   promised	   by	   many	   of	   the	   initial	   advocates	   of	   monetary	   union.	  Accompanying	   this	   view,	   has	   also	   been	   the	   claim	   that	   the	   actions	   of	   the	   EU	   make	   a	  difference	  to	   the	  global	  political	  economy	  because,	  by	   taking	  the	  moral	  high	  ground,	   it	  has	   become	   ‘a	   normative	   power’	   (Manners,	   2002),	   well	   equipped	   for	   leading	   global	  debates	  on	  issues	  ranging	  from	  abolishing	  the	  death	  penalty	  to	  climate	  change.	  	  Not	  surprisingly,	  the	  first	  part	  of	  the	  Delorist	  narrative	  has	  been	  consistently	  attacked	  by	  neo-­‐liberals	  who	  see	  freedom	  as	  the	  only	  plausible	  primary	  value.	  Given	  the	  deepening	  of	   neo-­‐liberalization	   at	   the	   scale	   of	   the	   EU	   that	   has	   taken	   place	   since	   the	  mid-­‐1990s,	  however,	   critics	   from	   the	   left	   have	   been	   even	  more	   vociferous	   in	   dismissing	   the	   EU’s	  commitments	   to	   a	   different,	   ‘more	   social’	   Europe	   made	   during	   the	   Delors	   era.	  Meanwhile,	   the	   supporting	   argument	   that	   the	   EU	   is	   a	   normative	   power	   has	   been	  criticized	  from	  those	  who,	  instead,	  consider	  that	  ‘a	  retreat	  from	  liberal	  internationalism’	  has	  taken	  place	  (Youngs,	  2010).	  	  Rather	  than	  take	  sides	  in	  the	  normative	  debate	  outlined	  above,	  the	  aim	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  test	  the	  heuristic	  value	  of	  a	  value-­‐centered	  approach	  to	  the	  EU’s	  actual	  involvement	  in	  economic	   activity	   using	   research	   I	   have	   recently	   conducted	   on	   the	   pharmaceutical	  industry	   and	   upon	   competition	   policy2.	   For	   each	   of	   these	   case	   studies,	   this	   book’s	  analytical	   framework	   is	   first	   applied	   to	   set	   out	   in	   a	   disciplined	  manner	   the	   extent	   to	  which	  the	  EU’s	  government	  of	  an	  industry	  or	  a	  trans-­‐industry	  regulation	  has	  changed	  as	  the	  dependent	  variable	  of	  our	  empirical	  studies,	   i.e.	  what	   is	   to	  be	  explained.	  From	  this	  base,	  the	  concept	  of	  political	  work	  is	  then	  mobilized	  as	  the	  independent	  variable	  which	  explains	   why	   parts	   of	   both	   these	   examples	   of	   the	   politics	   of	   economic	   activity	   have	  recently	  been	  challenged.	  Comparing	  pharmaceuticals	  to	  competition	  policy	  also	  has	  an	  additional	   interest	   in	   that,	  despite	   such	  challenges,	   the	  government	  and	  politics	  of	   the	  former	   has	   essentially	   been	   reproduced	   whilst	   that	   of	   competition	   has	   undergone	  considerable	  change.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  The	  data	  presented	  here	  is	  drawn	  from	  a	  programme	  of	  research	  I	  co-­‐led	  with	  Bernard	  Jullien	  from	  2009	  to	  2012	  which	   examined	   closely	   four	   industries	   (wine,	   pharmaceuticals,	   cars	   and	   aquaculture)	   and	   four	   transindustry	  regulations	  (competition,	  trade,	  sustainable	  development	  and	  employment).	  Entitled	  ‘le	  Gouvernement	  européen	  des	  industries’	   (GEDI),	   this	   programme	   was	   funded	   by	   the	   French	   Agence	   Nationale	   de	   la	   Recherche	   and	   has	   been	  published	  in	  book	  form	  (Jullien	  &	  Smith,	  2014).	  My	  thanks	  go	  to	  the	  15	  members	  of	  the	  GEDI	  team	  for	  their	  respective	  input.	  However,	  the	  analysis	  presented	  here,	  and	  thus	  responsibility	  for	  it,	  are	  mine	  alone.	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  As	  will	  be	  highlighted	  throughout,	  focusing	  upon	  the	  role	  played	  by	  values	  during	  these	  examples	  of	  EU	  government,	  and	  thus	  their	  politics,	  provides	  a	  means	  of	  revealing	  the	  key	   choices	   that	   were	   made,	   the	   alternatives	   that	   were	   stifled	   and	   the	   patterns	   of	  domination	  that	  have	  resulted	  or	  been	  reproduced.	  In	  so	  doing,	  a	  further	  goal	  will	  be	  to	  go	  considerably	  beyond	  visions	  of	  the	  EU	  as	  inextricably	  and	  inevitably	  ‘neo-­‐liberal’	  and	  depoliticized.	   Although,	   many	   actors	   involved	   in	   this	   scale	   of	   government	   can	   be	  depicted	  as	  neo-­‐liberals,	  and	  just	  as	  many	  do	  indeed	  seek	  to	  technicize	  the	  making	  of	  EU	  policies,	  this	  tells	  us	  little	  about	  the	  fundamentally	  political	  content	  of	  their	  beliefs	  and	  actions.	   For	   both	   analytical	   and	   normative	   reasons,	   this	   politics	   simply	   must	   be	  researched	   then	   debated	  more	   directly	   and	   openly	   than	   social	   science,	   and	   European	  Studies	  in	  particular,	  has	  thus	  far	  been	  able	  and	  prepared	  to	  do.	  	  	  
1.	  Freedom	  vs.	  Equality:	  Governing	  Pharmaceuticals	  	  Pharmaceuticals	   is	  often	  described	   in	   the	  media	  as	  a	  quintessentially	   ‘global’	   industry,	  and	   this	   because	   it	   features	   huge	   multinational	   firms	   (e.g.	   Pfizer,	   GlaxoSmithKline,	  Sanofi-­‐Aventis),	   products	   marketed	   throughout	   the	   world	   and	   apparently	   convergent	  rules	  set	  either	  multilaterally	  via	   the	  WTO,	  or	  within	  bilateral	  agreements.	  However,	  a	  closer	  look	  reveals	  that	  despite	  the	  Institutional	  Order	  of	  this	  industry	  becoming	  deeply	  multi-­‐scalar,	   and	   the	   scale	   of	   the	   EU	   taking	   on	   greater	   importance,	   many	   of	   its	   key	  practices	  continue	  to	  be	  structured	  nationally.	  This	  is	  particularly	  so	  around	  the	  issue	  of	  pricing,	   a	   political	   activity	   within	   which	   the	   values	   of	   freedom	   and	   equality	   are	  constantly	   in	   tension	   and	   frequently	   in	   conflict3.	   How	   then,	   and	   in	   the	   name	   of	   what	  hierarchies	   of	   values,	   have	   EU-­‐scale	   actors	   sought	   to	   make	   a	   difference	   and/or	  endeavoured	  to	  make	  this	  scale	  different	  from	  others?	  	  	  	  
1.1 An	  Institutional	  Order	  Under	  Threat	  	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  20th	  Century,	  the	  pharmaceutical	  industry	  both	  grew	  in	  size	  and	  became	   governed	   around	   a	   set	   of	   institutionalized	   practices.	   By	   the	  mid-­‐1970s,	   these	  were	   stabilized	   throughout	  OECD	   countries	   by	   legislation	   and	   policy	   instruments,	   but	  also	  by	  norms	  and	  expectations	  deeply	  rooted	  in	  societal,	  value-­‐based	  constructions	  of	  problems	  and	  legitimacy.	  	  Beginning	   with	   US	   Federal	   legislation	   in	   1902,	   a	   Sourcing	   IR	   emerged	   as	   a	   means	   of	  defining	   legitimate	  medicines,	   encouraging	   constant	   improvement	   in	   their	   safety	   and,	  consequently,	  providing	  a	  durable	  structure	  for	  markets	  around	  which	  firms	  developed	  long-­‐term	  investment,	  production	  and	  commercial	  strategies.	  Specifically,	   the	  principal	  regulatory	   instrument	   of	   this	   IR	   entails	   the	   according	   (or	   not)	   of	   a	   ‘Market	  Authorization’	   ostensibly	   upon	   the	   basis	   of	   each	   drug’s	   safety.	   Indeed,	   in	   the	   name	   of	  security,	  an	  application	  procedure	  involving	  clinical	  trials,	  then	  therapeutic	  assessment	  by	   panels	   of	  medical	   experts,	   can	   take	   ten	   years	   or	  more.	   In	   European	   countries	   this	  instrument	  was	  only	  formalized	  and	  tightened	  in	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s	  along	  lines	  first	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  This	   research	  has	  been	  carried	  out	  with	  Matthieu	  Montalban,	  Philippe	  Gorry	  and	  Marie-­‐Claude	  Belis-­‐Bergouignan	  from	   the	   GREThA	   economics	   research	   centre	   in	   Bordeaux	   University,	   as	   well	   as	   with	   Cyril	   Benoit	   from	   the	   same	  university’s	  Centre	  Emile	  Durkheim.	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developed	   in	   the	   US	   and	   after	   a	   series	   of	   ‘scandals’	   (notably	   concerning	   the	   drug	  thalidomide).	   During	   the	   1980s	   and	   early	   1990s,	   most	   West	   European	   states	   then	  proceeded	   to	   distance	   the	   assessment	   and	   approval	   of	  medicines	   from	  ministers	   and	  ministries	   of	   health	   through	   the	   creation	   of	   agencies	   akin	   to	   the	  US’s	   Food	   and	  Drug.	  Moreover,	   in	   1995	   a	   national	   scale	   of	   government	   was	   partly	   replaced	   by	   the	  introduction	   of	   a	   European	   Medicines	   Agency	   (EMA)	   based	   in	   London	   (Permanaud,	  2006;	   Hauray,	   2006).	   Notwithstanding	   this	   ‘agencization’	   and	   partial	   EU	  governmentalization,	   nor	   the	   sporadic	   emergence	  of	   further	   therapeutic	   scandals	   (e.g.	  the	   French	   ‘Mediator	   crisis’	   of	   2010/11),	   over	   the	   last	   four	   decades	   the	   industry’s	  Sourcing	  IR	  has	  nevertheless	  remained	  remarkably	  stable,	  and	  this	  largely	  because	  the	  value	  of	  security	  has	  been	  uncontested.	  	  	  	  	  	  Pharmaceutical	  markets	   have	  of	   course	   also	   been	  politically	   shaped	  by	   this	   industry’s	  
Commercial	  IR	  and	   its	   two	  principal	  sets	  of	  regulatory	   instruments	  concerning	  patents	  and	  pricing.	  Since	  the	  late	  19th	  century,	  firms	  have	  sought	  to	  protect	  and	  enhance	  their	  investment	   in	   research	   and	   development	   through	   an	   industry-­‐specific	   system	   of	  Intellectual	   Property	   Rights	   (IPR).	   By	   formally	   conciliating	   the	   values	   of	   freedom	   and	  security	   for	   ‘innovative	   firms’,	   the	   registering	   of	   a	   patent	   for	   a	   medicine	   forbids	  competitor	  firms	  from	  copying	  it	  for	  up	  to	  20	  years	  (including	  ten	  years	  after	  its	  initial	  marketing).	  Since	  1995,	  the	  World	  Trade	  Organization	  (WTO)	  has	  consolidated	  a	  global	  scale	   of	   government	   for	   this	   IPR	   though	   its	   TRIPS	   agreement	   (on	   Trade	   related	  Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Services)	  (Abbott	  &	  Dukes,	  2009).	  Moreover,	  over	  the	  last	  two	  decades	  repeated	  attempts	  have	  been	  made	  to	  create	  a	  European	  patent.	  Nevertheless,	  in	   Europe	   the	   actual	   registering,	   policing	   and	   judicial	   review	   of	   patents,	   and	   thus	   the	  balancing	  of	  freedom	  with	  security,	  still	  occurs	  essentially	  at	  the	  national	  scale.	  	  	  The	   continued	   significance	   of	   this	   scale	   also	   predominates	   in	   the	   setting	   of	   medicine	  prices,	   and	   this	   chiefly	   because	   the	   pricing	   of	   prescription	   medicines	   is	   actually	   an	  administered	   process	   within	   which	   ministries	   of	   health	   and	   social	   insurance	  organizations	  play	  major	  roles.	  Crucially,	  it	  is	  here	  that	  the	  value	  of	  equality	  is	  mobilized,	  or	   not,	   to	   defend	   particular	   approaches	   to	   the	   price	   of	   medicines.	   More	   specifically,	  because	  the	  fixing	  of	  such	  prices	  overlaps	  with	  the	  setting	  of	  rates	  of	  reimbursement	  by	  insurance	  that	  is	  public	  or	  private,	  and	  thus	  impacts	  directly	  upon	  national	  health	  costs	  and	  budgets,	   in	  each	  European	  state	   representatives	  of	   the	  civil	   service	  and	   insurance	  intervene	   heavily	   in	   pricing.	  Moreover,	   in	   the	   name	   of	   security	   -­‐defined	   here	  more	   in	  terms	   of	   durable	   supply	   than	   safety-­‐	   many	   states	   have	   used	   pricing	   as	   a	   means	   of	  encouraging	  the	  development	  of	  indigenous	  production,	  and	  thus	  as	  an	  industrial	  policy.	  As	  will	  be	  shown	  below,	  over	  the	  2000s	  both	  the	  key	  instruments	  of	  the	  pharmaceutical	  industry’s	   Commercial	   IR	   –patents	   and	   pricing-­‐	   have	   been	   increasingly	   challenged.	  Nevertheless,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   underline	   that	   the	   IR	   itself	   has	   remained	   particularly	  stable.	  	  	  	  	  	  Of	   course,	   the	   development	   of	   pharmaceutical	   firms	   and	   their	   invention	   of	  medicines	  could	  not	  have	  occurred	  without	  capital.	  At	   least	   in	  Europe,	   initially	  a	  myriad	  of	  small,	  family-­‐owned	   firms	   emerged,	   often	   alongside	   chemical	   producers	   in	   search	   of	  diversification	   (Chauveau,	   1999).	   After	   WW	   II,	   many	   of	   these	   firms	   progressively	  merged	   or	   were	   taken	   over,	   often	   benefiting	   from	   financial	   injections	   from	   national	  governments	   (e.g.	   Rhône	   Poulenc	   in	   France,	   the	   precursor	   of	   today’s	   Sanofi-­‐Aventis).	  Since	   the	   1990s,	   however,	   the	   Financial	   IR	   of	   this	   industry	   has	   been	   considerably	  
	   5	  
affected	  by	   the	   liberalization	  of	   financial	  markets,	   a	   trans-­‐industry	   regulation	   founded	  upon	  the	  value	  of	  freedom	  and	  its	  handmaiden,	   liberal	  political	  economy	  (Froud	  et.	  al.,	  2006).	   The	   most	   obvious	   impact	   of	   this	   regulation	   has	   been	   to	   encourage	   a	   rise	   in	  mergers	   or	   takeovers	   which	   cross	   national	   borders	   (e.g.	   GlaxoSmithKline	   in	   2000).	  Another	  major	  effect	  of	  this	  ‘financialization’	  (Montalbon,	  2008)	  has	  been	  to	  increase	  the	  power	   of	   large	   shareholders	   within	   the	   governance	   of	   these	   large	   corporations.	   Two	  highly	  evident	  consequences	  have	  been	  a	  change	  in	  the	  profile	  of	  their	  managers	  (with	  priority	   now	   given	   to	   personnel	   trained	   in	   finance)	   and	   an	   acceleration	   of	   quests	   for	  shorter-­‐term	   investment	   to	   secure	   more	   rapid	   returns	   on	   investment.	   As	   with	   the	  increased	   prominence	   given	   to	   the	   value	   of	   freedom,	   the	   liberalization	   of	   financial	  markets	  has	  certainly	  been	  encouraged	  by	  EU	  scale	  discourse,	  initiatives	  and	  legislation	  (Posner,	   2009).	   However,	   government	   at	   the	   European	   scale	   of	   this	   trans-­‐industry	  government	  of	  capital	  is	  less	  evident.	  Indeed,	  as	  the	  case	  of	  pharmaceuticals	  testifies,	  the	  generation	   and	   mobilization	   of	   capital	   now	   depends	   upon	   a	   plethora	   of	   policy	  instruments	  set	  at	  varying	  scales	  and	  without	  consistent	  hierarchy	  between	  them.	  	  	  By	  contrast,	   this	   industry’s	  Employment	  IR	   continues	   to	  be	  governed	  essentially	  at	   the	  national	   scale.	   Most,	   if	   not	   all,	   producer	   state	   governments	   claim	   to	   be	   committed	   to	  retaining	   qualified	   personnel,	   in	   particularly	   scientists,	   in	   order	   to	   keep	   medical	  invention	   and	   clinical	   trials	   within	   their	   borders.	   Various	   instruments	   are	   used	   to	  address	   this	   ‘problem’	   which	   include	   education	   and	   training	   policies,	   tax	   credits,	  subsidies	  for	  bio-­‐tech	  start	  ups,	  and	  hospital	  research	  grants.	  Meanwhile	  each	  country’s	  general	   employment	   laws	   and	   social	   protection	   systems	   are	   also	   invoked	   either	   to	  attract	   trained	   personnel	   from	   abroad,	   or	   as	   an	   argument	   for	   more	   government	  interventions	  in	  order	  to	  compensate	  for	  the	  supposed	  comparative	  advantage	  enjoyed	  by	  lower	  wage	  countries,	  particularly	  for	  clinical	  trials	  (e.g.	  Poland	  or	  the	  Ukraine).	  The	  value	   of	   security	   is	   thus	   regularly	   invoked	   in	   the	   discourse	   of	   both	   firms	   and	   public	  authorities.	   However,	   and	   in	   contrast	   to	   other	   industries	   such	   as	   automobiles	   where	  massive	  ‘relocation’	  has	  objectively	  occurred,	  but	  also	  been	  fiercely	  resisted,	  within	  the	  pharmaceutical	  industry	  the	  Employment	  IR	  is	  not	  where	  most	  political	  work	  has	  taken	  place.	   Instead,	   the	   prevalence	   of	   an	   essentially	   stable,	   national	   scale	   of	   governing	  employment	  issues	  in	  this	  industry	  is	  viewed	  as	  a	  given.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  summary,	  the	  Institutional	  Order	  (IO)	  of	  the	  pharmaceutical	  industry	  at	  the	  EU	  scale	  currently	   fits	  relatively	  seamlessly	  with	   its	  global	  and	  national	  ones	  (see	  table	  4.1).	   Its	  Sourcing	  and	  Employment	  IRs	  have	  remained	  remarkably	  stable	  and	  unchallenged	  since	  the	  1970s,	  and	  this	  despite	  the	  addition	  of	  EU-­‐scale	  government	  during	  this	  period.	  The	  industry’s	  Finance	  IR	  experienced	  considerable	  upheaval	  in	  the	  1990s,	  but	  again	  this	  did	  not	   challenge	   either	   the	   setting	   of	   problems	   and	   instruments,	   nor	   the	   registers	   of	  legitimation	   typically	   deployed.	   Finally	   if,	   as	   will	   be	   highlighted	   below,	   although	   this	  industry’s	   Commercial	   IR	   has	   recently	   experienced	   deeper	   threats	   to	   its	   institutions,	  since	  the	  late	  1990s	  the	  IO	  as	  a	  whole	  has	  been	  largely	  reproduced.	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Table	  4.1:	  The	  Institutional	  Order	  of	  the	  Pharmaceutical	  Industry	  in	  2014	  	   ‘Problems’	   Instruments	   Legitimacy	   Values	   Scale	  of	  govt.	  
Sourcing	  IR	   Safety,	  therapeutic	  quality	   Market	  Authorizations	   ‘Evidence-­‐based	  medicine’	   Security	   National	  &	  EU	  
Commercial	  IR	   Effectiveness	   Patents	   (IPR),	  prices	   and	   rates	  of	  reimbursement	  
‘Rewarding	  innovation’	   Freedom	  vs	  Equality,	  Security	  
National	   and	  global	  (IPR)	  
Financial	  IR	   ‘Free’	  capitalization	   Stock	   exchanges,	  R	   &	   D	   or	  ‘innovation’	  policies	  
‘Free	  movement	  of	  capital’	   Freedom	   Global,	   partly	  EU,	  national	  
Employment	  IR	   Qualified	  labour	   Labour	   law,	  social	   insurance,	  training	  policies	   ‘Maintaining	  industrial	  capacity’	   Security	   National	  	  	  
1.2 Politics	  causing	  reproduction:	  Pricing,	  Evaluation	  and	  ‘National	  Sovereignty’	  	  The	  construction,	  then	  reproduction,	  of	  this	  industry’s	  IO	  since	  WW	  II	  can	  be	  explained	  broadly	  using	  Neil	  Fligstein’s	  analysis	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘conceptions	  of	  control’.	  For	  Fligstein	  ‘a	  conception	  of	  control	  is	  a	  story	  about	  what	  the	  organization	  is	  and	  its	  location	  vis	  à	  vis	  its	   principal	   competitors.	   It	   is	   also	   an	   interpretive	   frame	  used	   to	   interpret	   and	   justify	  actions	   vis	  à	   vis	   others’	   (2001:	   69).	   As	   of	   the	   generalization	   of	  Market	   Authorizations	  based	  upon	  systematized	  clinical	  trials	  in	  the	  early	  1970s,	  this	  industry’s	  conception	  of	  control	  became	  dominated	  by	  large	  firms	  capable	  of:	  -­‐ protecting	  each	  ‘innovation’	  with	  a	  patent;	  -­‐ developing	  a	  continuous	  ‘pipeline’	  of	  new	  products	  undergoing	  trials	  then	  applying	  for	  Market	  Authorizations;	  -­‐ marketing	   the	   product	   throughout	   the	   world	   so	   as	   to	   make	   the	   most	   of	   its	  protection	  from	  imitations;	  -­‐ financing	  all	  these	  processes	  through	  recourse	  to	  stock	  markets;	  -­‐ concentrating	  research	  on	  the	  production	  of	  ‘blockbuster	  medicines’	  that	  generate	  sales	  of	  more	  than	  $1	  billion	  per	  year;	  -­‐ attracting	   the	   support	   of	   public	   health	   authorities	   (through	   high	   prices)	   and	  financiers	  (through	  investment).	  	  As	  Pignarre	  (2004)	  recounts	  in	  fascinating	  detail,	  although	  this	  model	  took	  much	  of	  its	  legitimacy	   and	   support	   from	   its	   supposed	   dependence	   upon	   rigorous	   ‘science’	   and	  ‘original’	   medicinal	   discoveries,	   very	   quickly	   it	   routinized	   and	   came	   to	   actively	  discourage	  much	   fundamental	   research	   and	   a	   striving	   for	   innovation.	   However,	   given	  the	  institutionalized	  character	  of	  the	  IRs	  underlined	  above,	  and	  the	  resources	  developed	  by	  the	  organizations	  who	  by	  then	  had	  been	  built	  to	  defend	  this	  state	  of	  affairs	  (e.g.	  the	  ABPI	  in	  the	  UK,	  the	  LEEM	  in	  France	  and	  the	  EFPIA	  in	  Brussels4),	  at	  least	  in	  Europe,	  the	  domination	  of	  this	   ‘blockbuster	  model’	  rolled	  on	  virtually	  unchallenged	  into	  the	  2000s.	  Indeed,	  despite	  a	  noticeable	  slowdown	  in	  the	  development	  of	  new	  medicines,	  it	  is	  only	  over	  the	  past	  two	  decades	  that	  the	  blockbuster	  model	  has	  begun	  to	  be	  challenged	  from	  two	  angles:	  patents	  and	  pricing.	  The	  former	  has	  been	  researched	  thoroughly	  by	  others,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  ABPI	   =	   Association	   of	   the	   British	   Pharmaceutical	   Industry;	   LEEM	   =	   Les	   Entreprises	   du	   Médicament;	   EFPIA	   =	  European	  Federation	  of	  Pharmaceutical	  Industry	  Associations.	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particularly	   over	   challenges	   to	   the	   TRIPS	   agreement	   sparked	   by	   the	   availability	   of	  treatments	   for	   AIDS	   in	   Africa	   (e.g.	   Muzaka,	   2011).	   Here	   the	   case	   of	   pricing	   is	  concentrated	  upon	  instead.	  This	  is	  because	  it	  has	  suffered	  from	  relative	  neglect,	  but	  also	  to	   show	  how	   this	   book’s	   framework	   reveals	   both	   the	   politics	   of	   pricing’s	   institutional	  reproduction	  and	  the	  value	  conflicts	  that	  lie	  at	  its	  heart.	  	  	  	  	  Far	   from	  being	   the	  direct	  consequence	  of	   the	   ‘play	  of	  market	   forces’	   so	  dear	   to	   liberal	  political	  economy,	  since	  WWII	  the	  setting	  of	  pharmaceutical	  prices	  in	  Europe,	  as	  well	  as	  much	   of	   the	   test	   of	   the	   world,	   has	   essentially	   been	   an	   administered	   process.	   More	  precisely,	  firms	  have	  requested	  prices	  for	  their	  products	  which	  differing	  configurations	  of	  civil	  servants	  and	  representatives	  of	  insurance	  organizations	  have	  analysed,	  debated	  and	  reached	  compromises	  over.	  For	  example,	  in	  France	  this	  process	  takes	  place	  within	  and	   around	   meetings	   of	   the	   Comité	   économique	   des	   produits	   de	   santé	   (CEPS)	   within	  which	   representatives	   of	   the	  ministries	   of	   health	   and	   industry,	   together	  with	   those	   of	  social	   and	   ‘mutuelle’	   insurance,	   possess	   institutionalized	   roles	   (Benoît	   &	   Nouguez,	  2015).	   Since	   the	   late	   1990s,	   most	   such	   actors	   have	   sought	   to	   reduce	   pharmaceutical	  prices	   in	  order	  to	   lower	  the	  cost	  of	  medicines	   in	   the	  name	  of	  equality.	  Specifically,	   the	  argument	   is	   that	  because	  drugs	   account	   for	   at	   least	   a	   fifth	  of	  health	   care	   expenditure,	  savings	  made	  here	  could	  be	  transferred	  to	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  sector	  where	  inequalities	  are	   increasing	   (eg.	   the	   availability	   of	   hospital	   beds).	   If	   the	   exception	   to	   this	   trend	  includes	   ‘innovative’	   firms	   and	   representatives	   of	  ministries	   of	   industry	   (both	   sets	   of	  actors	   arguing	   instead	   for	   higher	   prices	   in	   the	   name	   of	   ‘innovation’	   and	   security),	   a	  general	  consensus	  has	  nevertheless	  been	  built	  across	  Europe	  that	  medicines	  should	  not	  only	   cost	   less,	   but	   that	   their	   cost-­‐effectiveness	   should	   be	   examined	   more	   closely.	  However,	  and	  despite	  this	  consensus	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	   field	  of	  expertise	  (Health	  Technology	  Assessment:	  HTA)	  explicitly	  wedded	  to	  achieving	  its	  goals,	  national	  pricing	  systems	  in	  Europe	  for	  the	  most	  part	  remain	  inflationist	  and	  largely	  in	  line	  with	  the	  wish	  list	  of	  Big	  Pharma.	  Once	  again,	  the	  story	  of	  institutional	  reproduction	  revealed	  below	  can	  only	  be	  fully	  told	  by	  highlighting	  the	  conflicts	  between	  values	  that	  lie	  at	  its	  centre.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Problematization	   –	   The	   conception	   of	   control	   that	   has	   dominated	   Europe’s	  pharmaceutical	  industry	  since	  the	  early	  1970s	  defines	  the	  public	  problem	  of	  pricing	  as	  follows:	   prices	   must	   be	   set	   high	   enough	   to	   encourage	   ‘innovation’	   by	   guaranteeing	   a	  sufficient	   return	   on	   investment.	   When	   unpacked,	   this	   theory	   legitimizes	   nothing	   less	  than	   a	   form	   of	   active	   industrial	   policy	   which,	   far	   from	   being	   restricted	   to	   ‘the	   usual	  suspects’	   like	   France,	   is	   present	   within	   all	   European	   states	   where	   pharmaceuticals	  continue	  to	  be	  produced.	  For	  example,	  as	  a	  civil	  servant	  from	  the	  British	  Department	  of	  Health	   stressed	   on	   interview:	   ‘we	   have	   an	   approach	   that	   is	   surprisingly	   Colbertist!’5.	  This	   problematization	   of	   pricing	   has	   nevertheless	   recently	   been	   challenged	   from	   two	  angles.	  	  The	  first	  features	  representatives	  of	  health	  ministries	  and	  insurance	  organizations	  who	  have	  all	  sought	  to	  lower	  prices	  and,	  in	  general,	  to	  achieve	  this	  by	  introducing	  processes	  of	  evaluation	  between	  the	  moment	  a	  Market	  Authorization	  is	  awarded	  to	  a	  medicine	  and	  before	   its	   price	   is	   set.	   In	   some	   national	   cases	   (eg.	   the	   UK),	   the	   problematization	  promoted	  is	  one	  of	  only	  rewarding	  medicines	  that	  can	  prove	  their	  added	  value	  in	  terms	  of	  therapeutic	  advances	  but	  especially	   in	  terms	  of	   ‘value	  for	  money’.	   In	  others,	  notably	  France,	   problematization	   in	   this	   area	   is	   less	   formalized	   and,	   in	   any	   case,	   focused	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Interview,	  London,	  December	  2010.	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essentially	  upon	  identifying	  therapeutic	  added-­‐value	  rather	  than	  cost-­‐effectiveness.	  	  	  	  	  	  Alongside	  this	   first	  potential	  source	  of	  reprobematizating	  prices	   in	   the	  pharmaceutical	  industry,	   a	   second	   has	   emerged	   in	   the	   shape	   of	   a	   community	   of	   experts	   in	   HTA.	  Containing	   physicians,	   epidemiologists,	   health	   service	   managers	   and	   economists,	   the	  HTA	  community	  has	  become	  a	  consistent	  advocate	  of	  pricing	  reform	  since	  as	  early	  as	  the	  mid-­‐1970s	   (Benoît	  &	  Gorry,	   2013).	  However,	   their	   coalition	   has	   only	   institutionalized	  since	  the	  early	  1990s,	  notably	  around	  projects	  financed	  from	  the	  unlikely	  source	  of	  the	  EU,	  and	  more	  precisely	  the	  European	  Commission’s	  DG	  SANCO	  (Health	  and	  consumers).	  HTA	  problematizations	  always	  strive	  towards	  the	  ‘evidence-­‐based	  decision-­‐making’	  that	  has	   so	   frequently	   been	   sought	   in	   other	   sectors	   over	   the	   past	   two	   decades.	   Although	  differences	   of	   opinion	   and	   approach	   exist	   within	   the	   HTA	   movement,	   the	  reproblematization	  of	  medicines	  pricing	  proposed	  from	  this	  angle	  consists	  of	  beginning	  with	  both	  an	  assessment	  of	  societal	  needs	  and	  a	  questioning	  of	  the	  supposed	  novelty	  of	  the	  medicine	  in	  question.	  In	  short,	  the	  values	  of	  freedom	  and	  security	  that	  Big	  Pharma	  and	   its	   supporters	   so	   frequently	   invoke	   as	   their	   inextricably	   linked	   sources	   of	  inspiration	  and	  legitimacy,	  have	  both	  been	  questioned	  from	  three	  angles.	  Firstly	  critics,	  such	   as	   representatives	   of	   French	   ‘mutuelle’	   health	   insurance	   organizations	   working	  within	   La	   Mutualité	   Française,	   argue	   that	   the	   much	   vaunted	   freedom	   of	   large	  pharmaceutical	  companies	  is	  a	  myth	  given	  the	  support	  they	  have	  been	  given	  by	  public	  authorities	   since	   the	   1950s.	   Secondly,	   they	  maintain	   that	   security	   in	   this	   industry,	   i.e.	  both	  the	  safety	  of	  its	  products	  and	  its	  durability,	  could	  be	  achieved	  without	  recourse	  to	  policy	   instruments	  that	   lock	   in	  the	  rents	  of	   its	  biggest	  operators.	  Finally,	  and	  above	  all	  they	   have	   sought	   to	   reinstate	   equality	   as	   a	   value	   from	   which	   the	   health	   sector,	   and	  thence	  the	  pharmaceutical	  industry,	  should	  be	  reinstitutionalized.	  	  	  Despite	   the	   increasingly	   cohesive	   character	   of	   HTA	   alliances	   and	   their	   deepening	  linkages	   with	   ministerial	   and	   insurance	   representatives,	   however,	   a	   fundamental	  reframing	  of	  prices	  in	  this	  industry	  has	  yet	  to	  eventuate.	  As	  alluded	  to	  earlier,	  an	  initial	  explanation	   of	   this	   reproduced	  problematization	   lies	   in	   the	   support	   given	   to	   previous	  framings	  by	  ministries	  of	  industry	  and	  other	  allies	  of	  Big	  Pharma	  (patient	  associations,	  centrist	   and	   right	   wing	   MPs	   or	   MEPs,	   local	   politicians,	   etc.).	   Deeper	   explanation,	  however,	   lies	   in	   the	   institutionalized	   character	   of	   the	   ‘high	   prices	   as	   reward	   for	  innovation’	   theory	  of	   action	   that	  has	  dominated	  public	  problem	  setting,	   together	  with	  the	   policy	   instruments	   and	   registers	   of	   legitimation	   it	   has	   fed	   into	   and	   fed	   upon.	  Throughout	   the	   hierarchical	   role	   accorded	   to	   the	   value	   of	   ‘freedom’	   has	   protected	  institutionalized	  problems,	  instruments	  and	  modes	  of	  legitimation.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Instrumentation	   –	   Although	   decision-­‐making	   arenas	   such	   as	   the	   French	   CEPS	   possess	  sets	  of	  criteria	  for	  grading	  the	  social	  worth	  of	  new	  medicines,	  even	  omnipresent	  actors	  within	   such	   bodies	   recognize	   that	   they	   do	   not	   know	   how	   to	   evaluate	   the	   cost-­‐effectiveness	  of	  medicines	  with	  precision6.	   Instead,	   they	  depend	  upon	  statistics	  on	   the	  existing	   usage	   of	   competing	  medicines	   and	   their	   costs,	   an	   opinion	   on	   the	   therapeutic	  value	  of	  the	  medicine	  provided	  by	  the	  agency	  La	  Haute	  Autorité	  de	  la	  Santé	  (HAS),	  data	  from	   the	   Market	   Authorization	   procedure	   and	   any	   statistics	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Industry	  cares	  to	  mobilize	  (often	  provided	  by	  pharmaceutical	  firms	  and/or	  the	  LEEM).	  	  	  By	  contrast,	   the	  UK	  possesses	  a	  price-­‐setting	  procedure	  which	  has	  systematically	  used	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Interview,	  French	  Health	  Ministry,	  Paris,	  January	  2012.	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wider	   economic	   data	   and	   methods	   from	   economics	   in	   order	   to	   calculate	   the	   cost-­‐effectiveness	   of	   each	   new	   medicine.	   Run	   within	   the	   National	   Institute	   for	   Clinical	  Excellence	   (NICE),	   these	   calculations	   have	   been	   formalized	   as	   a	   policy	   instrument,	  known	   as	   ‘Quality	   life	   years’	   (QALYs),	   which	   has	   since	   become	   a	   central	   part	   of	   the	  British	  pricing	  system	  (Drummond,	  2007;	  Drummond	  and	  Sorenson,	  2009).	  Indeed,	  this	  instrument	  and,	  more	  generally,	  NICE’s	  involvement	  in	  pricing	  have	  clearly	  modified	  the	  problematization	  of	  pricing	  in	  that	  country.	  	  	  	  	  The	   HTA	   movement	   in	   general,	   and	   the	   parts	   of	   it	   financed	   and	   encouraged	   by	   the	  European	   Commission	   in	   particular,	   has	   largely	   taken	   on	   board	   the	   instruments	  developed	  by	  NICE.	  However,	  their	  success	  rate	  in	  terms	  of	  encouraging	  other	  national	  decision-­‐making	  systems	  to	  shift	  their	  policy	  instruments	  towards	  the	  British	  model	  has	  thus	   far	   been	   limited.	   As	   the	   French	   case	   testifies	   particularly	   clearly,	   the	   pricing	   of	  pharmaceuticals	  was	   initially	   institutionalized	  at	   a	   time	  when	   cost	   savings	  were	  not	   a	  priority	   and	   when	   doctors	   dominated	   decision-­‐making.	   Since	   then,	   the	   medical	  profession	  may	  have	  lost	  its	  aura	  in	  some	  countries,	  but	  in	  order	  for	  its	  expertise	  to	  be	  replaced,	  competing	  sources	  of	  knowledge	  need	  to	  emerge.	  In	  the	  British	  case,	  this	  has	  largely	   been	  provided	  by	   the	   growing	   (sub)discipline	   of	   health	   economics,	   itself	   a	   by-­‐product	  of	  changes	  to	  the	  UKs	  higher	  education	  system	  initiated	  in	  the	  1980s.	  The	  latter	  encouraged	   ‘applied’	   economics	   and	   systematic	   grant-­‐seeking	   by	   its	   academics	   in	  particular.	   Indeed,	   cleaved	   internally	   between	   those	  whose	   primary	   value	   is	   freedom	  (ex.	   experts	   closest	   to	   the	   Conservative	   Party)	   and	   those	   who	   instead	   hierarchize	  equality	   (ex.	  many	   of	   the	   academics	  working	   for	  NICE),	   to	   some	   extent	   British	   health	  economics	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   policy	   instrument	   which	   contributed	   significantly	   to	  reshaping	   the	   problem	  of	   health	   care	   in	  ways	  which	   perpetuate	   its	   very	   existence.	   At	  least	   in	   countries	   like	   France,	   this	   phenomenon	   has	   not	   emerged	   to	   anything	   like	   the	  same	  extent.	  Indeed,	  ‘a	  lack	  of	  expertise	  in	  health	  economics’	  is	  often	  cited	  by	  actors	  in	  ministries	  and	  insurance	  organizations	  as	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  why,	  over	  the	  last	  twenty	  years,	   the	   instruments	   of	   French	  medicines	   pricing	   have	   been	   reproduced.	   A	   study	   is	  currently	   being	   undertaken	   on	   the	   social	   groups	   involved	   in	   this	   process	   in	   order	   to	  deepen	  and	  objectify	  this	  assertion	  (Benoît,	  2016).	  From	  this	  research,	  it	  is	  already	  clear	  that	  in	  this	  country	  a	  network	  of	  HTA	  experts	  who	  give	  primacy	  to	  the	  value	  of	  equality	  has	  not	  emerged.	   Instead,	   the	   field	  has	   largely	  been	   left	  open	  to	   liberal	  economists	   for	  whom	  hierarchizing	  the	  values	  of	  freedom,	  while	  subordinating	  to	  it	  that	  of	  security,	  has	  encouraged	  the	  proposal	  of	  only	  incremental	  change	  to	  existing	  policy	  instruments.	  	  
Legitimation	   –	   Certain	   professions	   have	   therefore	   not	   only	   supported	   the	  instrumentation	   of	   decision-­‐making	   over	   issues	   like	   drug	   prices,	   they	   have	   also	  more	  fundamentally	  participated	  in	  legitimizing	  or	  delegitimizing	  both	  policy	  instruments	  and	  public	   problems.	   Meanwhile,	   however,	   the	   actors	   who,	   at	   least	   in	   the	   health	   sector,	  continue	  to	  hold	  the	  most	  resources	  for	  legitimizing	  policy	  reproduction	  or	  change	  are	  either	   national	   civil	   servants	   or	   politicians.	   Both	   these	   sets	   of	   actors	   readily	   brandish	  ‘the	  general	  interest’	  and	  ‘national	  sovereignty’	  as	  justifications	  for	  not	  changing	  pricing	  practices	  in	  line	  with	  what	  either	  the	  HTA	  movement	  or	  representatives	  of	  the	  European	  Commission	   advocate.	   What	   such	   terms	   cover	   up,	   however,	   are	   potent	   hierarchies	  between	   the	   values	   of	   freedom,	   security	   and	   equality	  which	   systematically	   favour	   the	  former	  while	  emptying	  the	  latter	  of	  any	  practical	  content	  and,	  therefore,	  impact.	  	  Indeed,	   ‘the	   general	   interest’	   is	   generally	   used	   alongside	   arguments	   of	   the	   type	   ‘our	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population	  would	  not	  accept’,	  and	  this	  in	  order	  to	  present	  each	  national	  case	  as	  singular	  and	  incomparable.	  Here,	  some	  national	  civil	  servants	  are	  aware	  that	  this	  discourse	  often	  puts	  them	  in	  a	  schizophrenic	  position:	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  they	  claim	  to	  be	  open	  to	   ideas	  from	   the	   rest	   of	   Europe,	   on	   the	   other	   they	   consider	   that	   they	   alone	   know	  what	   their	  national	  public	  will	  accept.	  Nevertheless,	  this	  claim	  to	  monopolize	  knowledge	  over	  what	  constitutes	   ‘the	   general	   interest’	   provides	   powerful	   support	   to	   politicians	   and	   civil	  servants	  who	  would	  rather	  not	  take	  the	  risk	  of	   institutional	  change	  and,	  consequently,	  prompt	  the	  ire	  of	   ‘their’	  pharmaceutical	  companies.	  In	  so	  doing	  the	  value	  of	  security	  is	  harnessed	   to	   the	   primacy	   of	   freedom,	  while	   that	   of	   equality	   is	   quietly	   ushered	   out	   of	  policy-­‐making	  equations.	  	  	  	  	  Such	   positionings	   take	   even	   more	   strength	   from	   legitimation	   based	   upon	   ‘national	  sovereignty’	   which,	   notably	   by	   invoking	   clauses	   on	   health	   in	   2009’s	   Lisbon	   treaty,	  consistently	  minimize	  the	  importance	  of	  exchanges	  over	  HTA	  at	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  EU	  while	  reiterating	   that	   only	   national	   administrations	   are	   authorized	   to	   structure	   and	   spend	  health	  budgets.	  Notwithstanding	  the	  effects	  prices	  in	  one	  member	  state	  have	  upon	  those	  in	   others,	   nor	   the	   increased	   interest	   of	   DG	   ECFIN	   in	   this	   subject	   area	   because	   of	   the	  scope	   it	   holds	   for	   cutting	   public	   expenditure,	   pharmaceutical	   pricing	   continues	   to	   be	  legitimized	   as	   a	   ‘régalien’	   (regal)	   national	   competence	   and,	   thus,	   as	   belonging	   in	   the	  same	  category	  as	  fiscal	  and	  defence	  matters.	  Faced	  with	  this	  discourse,	  opponents	  of	  the	  status	   quo	   currently	   consider	   that	   they	   have	   little	   option	   than	   to	   refocus	   HTA	  development	  on	  the	  therapeutic	  (i.e.	  quality	  and	  safety)	  dimension	  of	  the	  evaluation	  of	  medicines.	  Having	  built	  legitimacy	  using	  the	  register	  of	  universal	  science,	  some	  forecast	  they	  will	  subsequently	  be	  in	  a	  better	  position	  to	  ensure	  that	  issues	  of	  cost	  and	  efficiency	  become	  part	  of	  what	  can	  be	  debated	  around	  the	  pricing	  of	  medicines.	  However,	  in	  doing	  so,	   these	   critics	   of	   the	   pharmaceutical	   industry’s	   Institutional	   Order	   have	   unwittingly	  assisted	  in	  sidelining	  the	  value	  of	  equality.	  This	   in	  turn	  has	  enhanced	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  continuing	   to	   proclaim	   that	   combining	   freedom	   with	   security	   produces	   the	   most	  effective	  and	  just	  public	  policies	  and	  socio-­‐economic	  outcomes.	  	  	  	  In	  summary,	  the	  case	  of	  pharmaceutical	  pricing,	  and	  the	  modest	  role	  played	  by	  the	  EU-­‐scale	   therein,	   illustrates	   once	   again	   the	   heuristic	   value	   of	   analysing	   the	   value-­‐driven	  processes	   of	   problematization,	   instrumentation	   and	   legitimation	   that	   make	   up	   the	  political	   work	   which	   has	   caused	   the	   institutions	   and	   substantive	   outcomes	   outlined	  above.	  Rather	  than	  vaguely	  concluding	  that	  in	  today’s	  Europe	  regulation	  of	  this	  industry	  is	   ‘a	   patchwork’	   on	   EU	   and	   national	   measures	   (Mossialos,	   Permanand,	   Baeten	   and	  Hervey,	   2010),	   this	   analysis	   has	   indicated	   not	   only	   how	   and	   why	   this	   industry’s	  Commercial	  IR	  has	  been	  reproduced	  over	  the	  last	  15-­‐20	  years.	  It	  has	  also	  revealed	  why	  this	  IR	  has	  been	  so	  central	  to	  the	  pattern	  of	  domination	  of	  pharmaceuticals’	  Institutional	  Order	   as	   a	   whole.	   Although	   some	   scalar	   shifts	   have	   certainly	   occurred,	   to	   date	   the	  representatives	   of	   Big	   Pharma	   have	   successfully	   ‘tamed’	   such	   displacements	   and,	   in	  most	  cases,	  bent	  them	  to	  their	  own	  ends.	  Far	  from	  the	  fatalism	  of	  material	  determinism,	  these	   case	   studies	   have	   underlined	   that	   in	   each	   instance	   contingency	   has	   existed.	  However,	  thus	  far	  Big	  Pharma	  domination	  has	  also	  been	  fostered	  by	  public	  authorities	  not	   giving	   themselves	   the	   capacity	   to	   contest,	   or	   even	   seriously	   question,	  institutionalized	   prisms,	   arguments	   and	   symbolic	   action.	   From	   this	   respect,	   growing	  European	  integration	  has	  thus	  far	  only	  served	  to	  reinforce	  an	  Institutional	  Order	  within	  which	   the	   subordination	   of	   the	   value	   of	   Security	   to	   that	   of	   Freedom	   has	   prevented	  change	   in	   the	  name	  of	  greater	  Equality.	  From	  this	  perspective,	   the	  EU	  has	  very	  clearly	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not	  made	  a	  difference.	   Instead,	   it	  has	   contributed	   to	  aligning	  practice	  at	   the	  European	  scale	   with	   that	   which	   has	   dominated	   at	   national	   and	   global	   scales	   since	   at	   least	   the	  1970s.	  	  	  	  	  
2.	  Equality	  vs	  Security:	  Governing	  Competition	  	  Today	   competition	   policy	   often	   makes	   the	   headlines	   when	   a	   high	   profile	   corporate	  merger	  has	  been	  blocked	   for	   creating	   an	  oligopoly	   (eg.	   the	  proposed	  merger	  between	  Deutsche	  Börse	  and	  NYSE	  Euronext	  in	  2012	  rejected	  by	  both	  the	  European	  Commission	  and	   the	   US	  Department	   of	   Justice)	   or	  when	   the	   Commission	   prevents	   an	   EU	  member	  state	   from	   subsidizing	   one	   of	   its	   companies	   (eg.	   Poland	   and	   the	   airport	   of	   Gdynia	   in	  February	  2014).	  But	  this	  has	  not	  always	  been	  the	  case	  by	  any	  means.	  In	  fact,	  given	  the	  prior	  strength	  of	  protectionism	  and	  the	  neo-­‐mercantilist	  thinking	  that	  legitimated	  it,	  at	  least	   in	  Europe	  and	  in	  many	  other	  countries	  other	  than	  the	  US,	  competition	  policy	  has	  only	   really	  had	  significant	  and	  consistent	  effects	  upon	  economic	  activity	   since	   the	   late	  1980s.	  Many	   ‘power’	  and	   ‘interest’	   theorists	  attribute	  this	  development	  to	  competition	  policy	  being	  a	  key	  tool	  in	  constructing	  the	  EU’s	  single	  market	  and,	  more	  generally,	  to	  it	  becoming	  an	  instrument	  central	  to	  the	  ‘neo-­‐liberalization’	  of	  both	  politics	  and	  economic	  policy	   (Wigger	   and	  Nolke,	   2007;	   Van	   Apeldoorn,	   Drahokoupil,	   Horn,	   2008).	   However,	  both	   these	   interpretations	   are	   misleading	   and	   fail	   to	   capture	   the	   full	   relationship	  between	  politics	  and	  economic	  activity.	  The	   first	  confuses	  a	  consequence	  with	  a	  cause	  and	   overlooks	   that	   the	   original	   single	   market	   programme	   actually	   contained	   no	  competition	   policy	   element	   (Armstrong	   &	   Bulmer,	   1998).	   Meanwhile,	   and	   more	  significantly,	   conflating	   competition	   policy	  with	   neo-­‐liberalism	   greatly	   underestimates	  the	   depth	   of	   political	   divisions	   within	   this	   ideological	   family,	   particularly	   between	  ‘ordoliberals’	   and	   the	   ‘Chicago	   school	   of	   law	   and	   economics’.	   These	   schools	   of	   neo-­‐liberalism	   have	   grown	   precisely	   over	   their	   competing	   hierarchies	   of	   values	   used	   to	  evaluate	   legitimate	   economic	   activity	   in	   general,	   and	   inter-­‐firm	   competition	   in	  particular.	  	  Indeed,	  as	  I	  show	  below,	  the	  full	  story	  of	  the	  changing	  fortunes	  of	  competition	  policy	  is	  both	   more	   complex	   and	   more	   revealing	   of	   the	   politics-­‐economics	   nexus.	   It	   is	   more	  complex	  because	  it	  has	  entailed	  many	  more	  actors	  within	  and	  outside	  public	  authorities	  than	   are	   generally	   admitted,	   several	   scales	   of	   government	   and	   intense	   debate	   over	  doctrine	   and	   policy	   instruments.	   It	   is	   also	   more	   revealing	   because	   the	   story	   of	   how	  competition	   policy	   has,	   or	   has	   not,	   been	   applied	   in	   different	   polities	   illuminates	  profound	  fault	  lines	  within	  contemporary	  political	  economy.	  Indeed,	  this	  is	  particularly	  so	   when	   competition	   policy	   is	   conceptualized	   as	   a	   trans-­‐industry	   regulation	   which	  ostensibly	   applies	   to	   all	   industries	   and,	   at	   least	   in	   Europe,	   across	   three	   scales	   of	  government	  (EU,	  national,	  regional).	  Examining	  how	  different	  industries	  either	  conform	  or	  seek	  to	  derogate	  from	  competition	  policy	  provides	  an	  additional	  heuristic	  lens.	  	  Building	  upon	  a	  vast	   literature	   in	   law,	  history	  economics	  and	  political	   science	  and	  my	  own	   research7,	   this	   section’s	   analysis	   of	   competition	   policy	   will	   be	   structured	   in	   two	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Three	  sets	  of	  work	  have	  been	  undertaken	  on	  this	  issue	  area.	  The	  first	  concerned	  Leon	  Brittan’s	  role	  as	  commissioner	  for	  competition	  then	  trade	  from	  1989	  to	  1998	  (Joana	  &	  Smith,	  2002).	  Second,	  research	  was	  conducted	  on	  the	  role	  of	  competition	  policy	  in	  the	  EU’s	  government	  of	  industries	  in	  general,	  and	  that	  of	  pharmaceuticals	  and	  cars	  in	  particular	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parts.	  Having	  first	  set	  out	  the	  Institutional	  Order	  that	  has	  developed	  around	  this	  policy,	  hypotheses	  will	   then	  be	  presented	   regarding	   the	   value	   conflicts,	   and	   thus	   the	  politics,	  that	  has	  brought	  about	   this	  highly	  significant,	  yet	  not	  all-­‐encompassing,	   trans-­‐industry	  regulation.	  	  	  
2.1	  The	  Institutional	  Order	  of	  Economic	  Competition	  	  Considerable	   public	   debate	   remains	   over	   how	   competition	   policy	   should	   be	  problematized,	   instrumented	   and	   legitimized,	   debate	   soaked	   in	   value	   conflicts	  frequently	  criss-­‐crossed	  by	  inter-­‐scalar	  tensions.	  From	  an	  analytical	  point	  of	  view,	   it	   is	  salutary	  to	  begin	  examining	  such	  debates	  and	  conflict	  via	  the	  concept	  of	  an	  Institutional	  Order	  and	  the	  four	  Institutionalized	  Relationships	  (IRs)	  it	  helps	  unpack	  and	  compare.	  	  Competition	   policy’s	   Finance	   IR,	   this	   has	   had	   a	   major	   impact	   upon	   the	   politics	   of	  governing	  economic	  activity	  through	  two	  channels.	  The	  first	  concerns	  the	  outlawing	  of	  aid	  to	  private	  or	  indeed	  public	  businesses	  from	  the	  public	  purse.	  In	  an	  age	  when	  public	  finances	   are	   framed	   as	   particularly	   tight	   and	   multinational	   corporations	   tend	   to	  dominate	  most	  industries,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  forget	  that	  until	  the	  1980s	  national	  governments	  throughout	  the	  world	  frequently	  gave	  large	  sums	  of	  money	  directly	  to	  certain	  companies	  either	  simply	  to	  keep	  them	  in	  business	  or,	  more	  strategically,	  in	  the	  name	  of	  supporting	  their	  ‘national	  champion’	  in	  their	  efforts	  to	  compete	  both	  intra	  and	  internationally.	  	  Here	  analysis	   of	   the	   rise	   of	   neo-­‐liberalism	   has	   considerable	   analytical	   purchase	   because	   it	  highlights	   the	   manner	   through	   which	   this	   ideology	   was	   used	   to	   reproblematize	   how	  governments	  ought	  to	  support	   ‘their’	   industries,	   introduce	  new	  policy	  instruments	  (eg.	  the	  encouragement	  of	  inward	  investment)	  and	  legitimize	  the	  ‘independent’	  private	  firm	  whilst	   stigmatizing	   both	   all	   public	   ones	   and	   those	   that	   had	   taken	   the	   government’s	  shilling	   but	   continued	   to	   fail	   (‘lame	   ducks’).	   From	   steel,	   to	   coal	   and	   the	   car	   industry,	  since	   the	   1970s	  most	   governments	   throughout	   the	  world	   have	   progressively	   reduced	  their	   systematic	   granting	   of	   subsidies.	   Usages	   of	   competition	   policy	   have	   certainly	  driven	   forward	   this	   trend	   and	   institutionalized	   it	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   government	  intervention	  is	  now	  seen	  as	  ‘a-­‐normal’	  and	  ‘unnatural’.	  Of	  course,	  as	  repeated	  examples	  entailing	  European	  car	  manufacturers	  illustrate,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  many	  attempts	  are	  not	   still	  made	   to	   derogate	   from	   state	   aid	  policy,	   nor	   that	  many	   such	   attempts	   are	  temporarily	  successful.	  Similarly,	  there	  is	  little	  doubt	  that	  states	  such	  as	  China	  continue	  to	  pump	  money	  into	  their	  largest	  firms	  despite	  having	  established	  a	  competition	  agency.	  Nonetheless,	   because	   the	   value	   of	   Equality	   (of	   opportunity	   between	   firms)	   is	   rarely	  contested	  in	  this	  issue	  area,	  in	  general	  how	  competition	  policy	  impacts	  upon	  the	  Finance	  IR	  of	  all	  industries	  is	  rarely	  as	  controversial	  as	  it	  was	  thirty	  years	  ago.	  	  More	   controversy,	  however,	   still	   frequently	   surrounds	   the	   second	  aspect	  of	   regulating	  competition	   that	   concerns	   company	   finances:	   the	   control	   of	  monopolies	   and	  mergers.	  Whereas	  virtually	  all	  the	  expert	  and	  actors	  engaged	  in	  this	  issue	  area	  accept	  that	  large	  companies	  should	  never	  be	  allowed	  by	  government	  to	  ‘abuse	  their	  dominant	  position’	  in	  particular	   markets	   or	   industries	   (for	   example	   by	   raising	   prices	   to	   the	   consumer	   or	  dropping	   them	   to	   eliminate	   competitors),	   much	   disagreement	   persists	   about	   what	  constitutes	   ‘dominance’	   and	   ‘abuse’.	   Indeed,	   far	   from	   being	   just	   technical	   terms	   with	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Montalban,	  Ramirez	  Perez,	  Smith,	  2014).	  Finally,	  analysis	  of	  policy	  transfer	  between	  DG	  COMP	  and	  the	  French	  and	  British	  competition	  authorities	  has	  been	  tackled	  (Smith,	  2013).	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legally	   codified	   definitions	   and	   criteria,	   both	   frequently	   split	   the	   neo-­‐liberal	   camp	  around	  the	  hierarchies	  of	  values	  their	  application	  invariably	  entails.	  For	  ordoliberals	  to	  whom	   Equality	   is	   a	   value	   to	  which	   Freedom	  must	   remain	   subservient,	   any	   dominant	  position	  within	  a	  market	  is	  bad,	  no	  matter	  whether	  it	  has	  actually	  been	  taken	  advantage	  of	  or	  not.	  Consequently	  mergers	  or	  take-­‐overs	  that	  create	  such	  positions	  of	  dominance	  should	   be	   prohibited	   by	   competition	   agencies.	   By	   contrast,	   for	   supporters	   of	   ‘the	  Chicago	   School’	   to	   whom	   Freedom	   can	   and	   should	   frequently	   trump	   Equality,	   a	  dominant	  position	  does	  not	  in	  itself	  represent	  a	  threat	  to	  consumers.	  Indeed,	  they	  argue,	  the	  efficiency	  gained	   through	   this	  position	   is	   actually	  beneficial	  because	   it	  will	   lead	   to	  lower	   prices.	   In	   short,	   ‘efficiency’	   trumps	   legal	   rectitude,	   equality	   of	   opportunity	   and,	  many	  would	  say,	  ‘fairness’.	  The	  next	  section	  returns	  to	  this	  debate	  in	  more	  detail.	  For	  the	  moment	  it	  is	  sufficient	  to	  conclude	  that	  recurrent	  conflict	  over	  monopolies	  and	  mergers	  goes	  to	  the	  very	  heart	  of	  the	  politics	  of	  contemporary	  economic	  activity.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  If,	  as	  we	  have	  just	  seen,	  competition	  policy	  impacts	  heavily	  upon	  the	  way	  businesses	  are	  financed,	  throughout	  much	  of	  the	  world	  its	  	  Sourcing	  IR	  has	  come	  to	  have	  similar	  effects	  upon	   the	   way	   such	   entities	   purchase	   their	   raw	   materials	   and	   transform	   them	   into	  products.	   Often	   called	   ‘anti-­‐trust’	   law,	   the	   official	   aim	   here	   is	   to	   outlaw	   ‘restrictive	  practices’	   in	   general	   and	   those	   that	   produce	   cartels	   (ie.	   collusions	   between	   firms)	   in	  particular,	  both	  seen	  as	  interrupting	  and	  biasing	  the	  ‘free	  flow’	  of	  inter-­‐firm	  competition.	  In	   many	   industries,	   sourcing	   takes	   place	   through	   a	   relatively	   straightforward	  relationship	   between	   suppliers	   and	  purchasers.	   For	   example,	   farmers	  who	   rear	   ducks	  set	   up	   and	   generally	   honour	   private	   contracts	   with	   the	   hatcheries	   that	   provide	   them	  with	   ducklings.	   Here,	   a	   practice	   judged	   to	   be	   restrictive	   would	   only	   occur	   if	   such	  contracting	  was	  seen	  as	  imposed	  or	  unfair.	  However,	  in	  many	  other	  industries,	  rules	  and	  norms	  exist	  regarding	  how	  and	  where	  a	  raw	  material	  has	  been	  produced	  which	  clearly	  infringe	  general	  competition	  law	  but	  have	  been	  authorized	  in	  the	  name	  of	  other	  values.	  Here	  a	  case	  in	  point	  concerns	  Parma	  Ham.	  As	  we	  saw	  through	  similar	  cases	  in	  chapter	  3,	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1990s,	  producers	  of	  ham	  in	  this	  region	  decided	  that	  for	  a	  product	  to	  bear	  its	  name,	   its	   curing	   had	   to	   take	   place	   within	   a	   locality	   defined	   as	   ‘Parma’.	   Codified	   in	   a	  product	  specification,	  this	  restriction	  was	  contested	  by	  certain	  operators	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	   it	   infringed	   competition	   law.	   However,	   the	   European	   Court	   of	   Justice	   upheld	   the	  right	  of	  Parma	  Ham	  producers	  to	  impose	  this	  restriction	  in	  the	  name	  of	  both	  ‘enhancing	  regional	   development’	   (Security	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   sustainability)	   and	   ‘protecting	   a	  tradition’.	   Far	   from	   being	   exceptional,	   such	   arguments	   and	   restrictions	   are	   relatively	  commonplace,	  for	  example	  just	  as	  all	  Rioja	  wine	  has	  to	  be	  bottled	  in	  that	  region,	  so	  does	  all	  Scotch	  have	  to	  be	  matured	  and	  bottled	  in	  Scotland.	  What	  all	  these	  cases	  highlight	  is	  that	   the	   actual	   implementation	   of	   competition	   policy	   is	   never	   value-­‐free	   and	   thus	   a-­‐political.	   Rather	   its	   application	   within	   specific	   industries	   and	   markets	   always	   entails	  hierarchizing	  values	  through	  the	  political	  work	  of	  argument	  and	  alliance-­‐making.	  	  	  	  	  In	   so	   doing,	   many	   of	   the	   arguments	   made	   over	   product	   sourcing	   spill	   over	   into	  competition	   policy’s	   Commercial	   IR	   which	   concerns	   how	   goods	   and	   services	   are	  distributed	   and	   sold.	   Once	   again,	   in	  many	   industries	   the	   relationship	   between	   sellers	  and	  consumers	  can	  appear	  relatively	  straightforward.	  So	  long	  as	  all	  sellers	  have	  access	  to	  the	  market,	  consumers	  simply	  choose	  between	  competing	  products,	  thereby	  entering	  into	   a	  more	   or	   less	   implicit	   contract	  with	   the	   respective	   producer.	  A	   first	   contentious	  issue	  may,	  however,	  arise	  whenever	  the	  distribution	  of	  a	  good	  or	  service	  is	  dominated	  by	  large	  operators	  such	  as	  supermarket	  chains.	  As	  the	  case	  of	  basic	  farm	  produce	  such	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as	  milk	   testifies,	   such	   intermediaries	  may	  make	   huge	   profits	   by	   significantly	   reducing	  prices	   to	   farmers	  while	   increasing	  them	  to	  consumers.	  More	   fundamentally	  still,	   inter-­‐firm	  competition	  may	  be	  affected	  by	  a	  range	  of	  norms	  that	  restrict	  the	  access	  of	  goods	  and	   products	   to	   markets	   in	   the	   name	   of	   a	   variety	   of	   values.	   Here	   one	   of	   the	   classic	  examples	   concerns	   patents	   for	  medicines.	   As	  we	   saw	   earlier,	   since	   at	   least	   the	   1970s	  patents	  have	  been	  consistently	  used	  by	  pharmaceutical	   firms	  not	  only	   to	  protect	   their	  respective	  inventions,	  but	  also	  to	  ensure	  that	  during	  each	  period	  of	  legal	  protection	  they	  can	  achieve	  high	  returns	  on	  the	  investments	  which,	  they	  argue,	  were	  made	  in	  order	  to	  generate	  such	  ‘scientific	  progress’.	  In	  short,	  for	  such	  actors	  patents	  are	  instruments	  that	  respond	   to	   the	   problem	   of	   ‘rewarding	   innovation’	   in	   the	   name	   of	   equality,	   whilst	  ‘innovation’	  itself	  is	  seen	  as	  their	  primary	  legitimizing	  resource	  because	  it	  concretizes	  a	  relationship	  between	  Freedom	  and	  Security.	  If	  for	  many	  years	  patents	  were	  indeed	  seen	  by	   competition	   authorities	   as	   an	   acceptable	   restrictive	   practice,	   in	   2009	   this	  representation	   of	   the	   just	   was	   put	   to	   the	   test	   when	   the	   European	   Commission’s	   DG	  COMP	  launched	  a	   ‘sector	  inquiry’	   into	  how	  market	  entry	  was	  actually	  occurring	  within	  this	   industry.	   As	   explained	   fully	   elsewhere	   (Montalban,	   Ramirez	   Perez,	   Smith,	   2014),	  officials	  in	  DG	  COMP	  suspected	  large	  pharmaceutical	  companies	  of	  abusing	  patent	  law	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  generic	  products	  entering	  the	  market	  and	  lowering	  prices	  (thus	  locking	  in	   a	   hierarchy	   of	   Security	   over	   Freedom).	   Although	   patents	   as	   a	   property	   right	   were	  ultimately	   relegitimized	   as	   acceptable	   restrictive	   practices,	   the	   importance	   that	   had	  automatically	   been	   accorded	   to	   scientific	   innovation	   has	   been	   destabilized	   and	  increasingly	  questioned.	  Specifically,	   the	  hierarchy	  between	  Security	  and	  Freedom	  has	  been	   opened	   up	   to	   debate.	   In	   so	   doing,	   this	   case	   illustrates	   once	   again	   how	  markets	  never	   regulate	   themselves.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   their	   regulation	   is	   constantly	   dependent	  upon	   the	   value-­‐based	   choices	  made	   by	   those	   able	   to	   participate	   in	   their	   institutional	  ordering.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Finally,	   although	   the	   Employment	   IR	   is	   not	   directly	   affected	   by	   competition	   policy,	   it	  certainly	   has	   been	   indirectly.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   as	   the	   case	   of	   Parma	   Ham	   again	  illustrates,	   saving	   or	   creating	   jobs	   in	   specific	   regions	   (Security)	   is	   often	   used	   as	   an	  argument	  to	  obtain	  derogations	  from	  competition	  policy.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  and	  more	  generally,	   the	   underlying	   problematization	   of	   economic	   activity	   that	   pervades	  competition	   policy	   is	   one	   of	   businesses	   only	   being	   durably	   viable	   when	   they	   are	  ‘competitive’,	   i.e.	   not	   dependent	   upon	   government	   subsidies	   or	   an	   illicit	   dominant	  position	   or	   set	   of	   restrictive	   practices.	   Implicitly,	   as	   the	   case	   of	   coal	   in	   the	   United	  Kingdom	   in	   the	   1980s	   illustrates,	   the	   view	   taken	   here	   is	   that	   it	   is	   preferable	   that	  ‘uncompetitive’	   businesses	   go	   to	   the	  wall	   so	   that	   their	   ex-­‐employees	   themselves	   seek	  out	   viable	   employers	   and	   industries.	   Because	   ‘viability’	   is	   often	   a	   heatedly	   contested	  concept,	   however,	   this	   then	   begs	   further	   questions.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   British	   coal,	   for	  example,	   trade	   unions	   accused	   employers	   and	   the	   UK	   government	   of	   deliberately	  exaggerating	  costs	  of	  production	  and	  reducing	  forecasts	  of	  the	  amount	  of	  coal	  that	  could	  still	  be	  viably	  mined.	  	  	  More	   fundamentally	   still,	   the	   controversies	   that	   frequently	   still	   break	   out	   over	  competition	   policy	   highlight	   just	   how	   disarmed	   proponents	   of	   problems	   and	  instruments	  designed	  explicitly	   to	  save	  employment	  are	  compared	   to	   their	  neo-­‐liberal	  opponents.	  Indeed,	  as	  stated	  earlier	  and	  as	  table	  4.2	  highlights,	  if	  the	  latter	  are	  regularly	  divided	  over	   interpreting	   competition	  policy,	   social	   democratic	   thought	  has	   singularly	  failed	   to	  produce	  a	   sustained	  alternative	  viewpoint	  which	  does	  not	   fall	   back	  upon	   the	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easily	  discreditable	  principles	  of	  neo-­‐mercantilism.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Table	  4.2:	  Competition	  policy	  doctrines	  and	  economic	  activity	  	   Neo-­‐mercantilism	   Ordoliberalism	   Chicago	  school	  Finance	  IR	   Monopolies	   No	  monopolies	   Efficient	  monopolies	  Sourcing	  IR	   Cartels	   No	  Cartels	   Efficient	  cartels	  Commercial	  IR	   Price	  fixing	   Free	  pricing	   Free	  pricing	  Employment	  IR	   Interventionist	   Laissez	  faire	   Laissez	  faire	  Dominant	  value	   Security	   Security	   Freedom	  	  	  
2.2	  A	  politics	  where	  explicit	  values	  give	  way	  to	  expertise	  and	  sovereignty	  	  	  The	  reason	  table	  4.2	  does	  not	  feature	  a	  column	  on	  social	  democratic	  competition	  policy	  doctrine	   is	   not	   simply	   that	   such	   a	   set	   of	   ideas	   has	   yet	   to	   be	   convincingly	   brought	  together	  (although	  this	  is	  indeed	  a	  key	  point).	  Rather	  the	  translation	  of	  socio-­‐democratic	  principles	   into	   problematizations	   of	   competition	   policy,	   instruments	   and	   legitimating	  discourse	  has	  been	  obstructed	  by	  this	  domain	  becoming	  dominated	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  by	  the	  narrowness	  of	  what	  constitutes	   ‘expertise’	   in	  competition	  policy	  and,	  on	  the	  other,	  by	  the	  translation	  of	  ‘sovereignty’	  into	  what	  I	  call	  a	  ‘pseudo-­‐value’.	  	  	  
The	  autonomization	  of	  experts	  and	  depoliticization	  	  Political	   science	   and	   sociology	   have	   consistently	   shown	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   ‘experts’	  with	   specialized	   knowledge	   have	   come	   to	   play	   powerful	   roles	   in	   policy-­‐making	  throughout	   the	  world	  and	  across	  virtually	  all	   issue	  areas.	   Indeed,	   the	  most	   interesting	  work	  on	  this	  question	  traces	  this	   influence	  back	  to	  at	   least	   the	  end	  of	   the	  19th	  century	  when	  Western	   state	   bureaucracies	   began	   to	   densify	   (Saint-­‐Martin,	   2000).	   Ever	   since,	  just	  who	  constitutes	  an	  ‘expert’	  has	  become	  a	  deeply	  political	  question	  because	  far	  from	  stemming	   simply	   from	   formal	   qualifications	   or	   ‘the	   complexity’	   of	   an	   issue	   and	   its	  instrumentation,	  the	  very	  legitimation	  of	  their	  knowledge	  is	  the	  product	  of	  work	  to	  build	  the	   reputations	   of,	   and	   thus	   attach	   values	   to,	   both	   individuals	   and	   their	   professions	  (Robert,	  2010;	  Roger	  2010).	  Indeed,	  the	  vague	  nature	  of	  the	  very	  term	  ‘expertise’	  in	  fact	  highlights	   the	   fluctuating	   and	   contingent	   nature	   of	   just	  who	   is	   qualified	   as	   an	   ‘expert’	  and	  by	  whom.	   In	  some	   instances,	   it	   is	  bureaucrats	  employed	  by	  public	  authorities	  (eg.	  the	   civil	   servants	   in	  DG	  COMP)	  who	  are	   seen	   to	  be	   the	  experts.	   In	  others,	   this	   term	   is	  instead	  reserved	  for	  external	  advisers	  who	  work	  within	  academia,	  for	  consultancy	  firms	  or	   even	   for	   interest	   groups.	   From	   the	  point	   of	   view	  of	   research,	   therefore,	   identifying	  who	  has	  been	   legitimized	  as	  an	  expert	   in	  a	  given	  policy	   field,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   resources	  they	   hold	   or	   that	   are	   attributed	   to	   them,	   and	   above	   all	   their	   hierarchies	   of	   values,	  constitutes	  an	  essential	  first	  step.	  The	  second	  is	  to	  discover	  to	  what	  extent	  these	  experts	  have	  developed	  autonomy	   for	   themselves	  and,	   in	  particular,	  a	   freedom	  from	  oversight	  by	  actors	  charged	  with	  protecting	  the	  public	  interest	  (notably	  parliamentarians).	  	  In	   the	   field	   of	   competition	   policy,	   the	   overwhelming	   majority	   of	   experts	   have	   been	  trained	  in,	  and	  take	  much	  of	  their	  legitimacy	  from,	  the	  academic	  disciplines	  of	   law	  and	  economics.	  Moreover,	  the	  dominance	  of	  both	  is	  also	  reflected	  in	  the	  career	  trajectories	  of	  officials	  who	  work	  within	  competition	  regulatory	  agencies.	  Indeed,	  many	  of	  the	  latter	  have	   moved	   seamlessly	   between	   such	   bodies	   and	   these	   parts	   of	   academia,	   thereby	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consolidating	   cognitive	   links	   with	   relational	   ones.	   Meanwhile,	   law	   and	   economics	  dominate	   the	   wide	   range	   of	   journals	   (eg.	   World	   Competition)	   which	   both	   facilitate	  communication	  across	  an	  international	  ‘community’	  of	  competition	  policy	  experts,	  while	  encouraging	  a	  standardized	  problematization	  of	  its	  thought	  and	  action.	  Indeed,	  research	  has	  strongly	  suggested	  that	  competition	  policy	  is	  considerably	  affected	  by	  transnational	  networks	  and	  an	   ‘epistemic	  community’	  of	  scholars,	  bureaucrats	  and	  even	  judges	  (Van	  Waarden	   and	   Drahos,	   2002;	   Wigger,	   2008).	   Moreover,	   administrations	   such	   as	   the	  European	   Commission	   have	   further	   encouraged	   this	   trend	   through	   and	   around	   the	  establishment	   of	   a	   European	   Competition	   Network	   which,	   since	   2004,	   has	   imposed	  highly	   structured	   ‘co-­‐operation’	   upon	   competition	   policy	   agencies	   and	   their	   experts	  across	  the	  EU.	  	  Notwithstanding	   these	   pressures	   to	   transnationalize	   the	   doctrines	   and	   practices	   of	  competition	  policy,	  important	  differences	  remain	  regarding	  how	  experts	  trained	  in	  law	  or	  economics	  are	  mobilized	  within	  each	  polity.	  In	  France,	  for	  example,	  law	  continues	  to	  be	  the	  dominant	  source	  of	  expertise	  drawn	  upon	  by	  the	  Autorité	  de	  la	  Concurrence	  and	  its	  predecessor	  the	  Conseil	  de	  la	  Concurrence.	  In	  the	  field	  of	  anti-­‐trust,	  this	  organization	  made	  335	  decisions	  between	  1999	  and	  2011,	  but	  economic	  analysis	  was	  evoked	  in	  only	  24	  of	  them	  (Smith,	  2013:	  428).	  Moreover,	  if	  it	  has	  possessed	  a	  Chief	  Economist	  complete	  with	  dedicated	  staff	   since	  2007,	   these	  actors	  are	   in	  a	   tiny	  minority	  when	  compared	  to	  the	   legally-­‐trained	  officials	   law	  which	  surround	  them.	  By	  contrast,	   in	  England	  both	  the	  Office	  of	  Fair	  Trading	  and	  the	  Competition	  Commission	  regularly	  use	  economic	  analysis	  to	  problematize,	  instrument	  and	  legitimize	  their	  decisions	  (eg.	  over	  restrictive	  practices	  the	  former	  did	  so	  to	  the	  tune	  of	  19	  out	  of	  67	  decisions	  between	  2001	  and	  2011,	  whilst	  the	   latter	  did	   in	  23	  out	  of	  25	  of	   its	   reports:	   Smith,	  2013:	  434-­‐5).	   In	   short,	   the	   tension	  between	  law	  and	  economics	  plays	  out	  differently	  in	  each	  polity.	  	  This	  said,	  it	  is	  important	  not	  to	  see	  such	  tension	  as	  simply	  an	  opposition	  between	  users	  of	   either	   the	   law	   or	   statistics.	   Firstly,	   skilful	   representatives	   of	   either	   discipline	  repeatedly	   deploy	   both.	   Secondly,	   as	   seen	   earlier,	   the	   key	   division	   which	   orientates	  doctrine	   and	   practice	   lies	   in	   a	   value-­‐driven	   cleavage	   between	   ordoliberals	   and	  proponents	  of	  ‘the	  Chicago	  school	  of	  law	  and	  economics’.	  For	  the	  former,	  law	  is	  certainly	  the	   field	   of	   expertise	   its	   supporters	  have	   traditionally	   and	  most	   spontaneously	  drawn	  upon.	  But	   it	   is	   important	  to	  realize	  that	  ordoliberalism	  also	  has	   its	  economists	  who,	   in	  the	  name	  of	  placing	  Security	  above	  Freedom,	  use	  arguments	  from	  their	  own	  discipline	  to	  problematize,	  instrument	  and	  legitimize	  its	  policy	  recipes.	  Conversely	  if,	  as	  its	  full	  name	  underlines,	   the	   Chicago	   school	   has	   always	   sought	   to	   combine	   arguments	   from	   both	  disciplines,	   it	   is	  vital	   to	  grasp	  the	  key	  role	  played	  by	   lawyers,	  and	  even	  supreme	  court	  judges	  (eg.	  Posner	  or	  Bork),	  within	  its	  development.	  It	  is	  certainly	  true	  that	  just	  as	  today	  economics	  has	  a	  much	  higher	  public	  profile	  than	  law	  in	  most	  polities,	  economists	  are	  the	  most	   well	   known	   promoters	   of	   Chicago	   School	   interpretations	   of	   competition	   policy.	  Ultimately,	   however,	   it	   is	   the	   combination	   of	   law	   and	   economics,	  mobilised	   around	   a	  hierarchy	  of	  values	  wherein	  Freedom	  trumps	  Security,	  that	  deserves	  the	  most	  analytical	  and	  public	  attention.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Indeed,	  what	   research	  could	  usefully	  be	  doing,	  but	   to	  my	  knowledge	  rarely	  does,	   is	   to	  examine	  the	  activity	  of	  key	  competition	  regulators,	  such	  as	  DG	  COMP,	  in	  order	  to	  identify	  precisely	   how	   doctrinal	   debates	   are	   influenced	   by	   broader	   discussions	   within	   and	  between	   law	   and	   economics.	   Such	   research	   should,	   however,	   not	   only	   focus	   upon	   the	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highly	  detailed	  and	  technicized	  arguments	  made.	  In	  so	  doing,	  attention	  also	  needs	  to	  be	  devoted	   to	   the	   values	   that	   reside	   in	   the	   assumptions	   and	   judgements	   that	   drive	   and	  derive	   from	   these	   arguments.	   This	   politics	   of	   competition	   policy	   has	   yet	   to	   get	   the	  academic	  attention	  it	  deserves,	  and	  this	  largely	  because	  the	  disciplines	  best	  equipped	  to	  do	   so	   –political	   science	   and	   sociology-­‐	   have	   thus	   far	   largely	   ignored	   it.	   Small	  wonder	  then	  that	  when	  public	  authorities	  such	  as	  parliamentary	  committees	  turn	  their	  hand	  to	  examining	  competition	  policy,	  they	  too	  largely	  overlook	  the	  value-­‐based	  choices	  that	  are	  constantly	   being	   made	   in	   its	   name	   and	   which	   merit	   much	   more	   public	   and	   political	  deliberation.	   Indeed,	   it	   is	  only	   through	  opening	  competition	  policy	  up	   to	  discussion	  of	  the	   politics	   of	   competition	   that	   there	   is	   any	   chance	   that	   the	   ordoliberal	   vs.	   Chicago	  School	   opposition	  might	   one	   day	   be	   destabilized	   by	   the	   emergence	   of	   another	   set	   of	  doctrines	  (and	  perhaps	  even	  one	  based	  upon	  social-­‐democratic	  values	  and	  priorities).	  	  	  	  
Sovereignty:	  a	  thought-­‐obstructing	  and	  alliance-­‐blocking	  value	  	  Opening	  up	  the	  sources	  of	  expertise	  on	  competition	  policy	  could	  also	  help	  to	  unblock	  a	  second	  important	  aspect	  of	  competition	  policy	  which	  concerns	  its	  possible	  introduction	  at	   a	   global	   scale.	   An	   EU-­‐led	   initiative	   to	   move	   in	   this	   direction	   emerged	   in	   the	   early	  1990s	  but	  has	  since	  run	  into	  virulent	  opposition	  using	  the	  card	  of	  national	  sovereignty.	  As	  will	  be	  shown,	  however,	  despite	  the	  legitimate	  concerns	  expressed	  about	  this	  issue,	  particularly	  within	  the	  developing	  world,	  this	  opposition	  has	  tended	  to	  polarize	  debates	  around	  a	  pro.	  vs.	  anti	  competition	  policy	  axis.	  The	  alternative	  viewpoint	  presented	  here	  is	  that	  be	  they	  explicit	  or	   implicit,	  competition	  policies	  exist	  throughout	  the	  world	  and	  therefore	   have	   a	   deep	   impact	   upon	   trade	   and	   thus	   the	   relationships	   between	   firms,	  nations	   and	   societies.	   Invoking	   national	   sovereignty	   as	   a	   value,	   i.e.	   something	   that	   is	  intrinsically	   ‘good’,	   obstructs	   thinking	   about	   the	   overlapping	   regulation	   of	   both	   trade	  and	  competition,	  misleads	  the	  public	  and	  perpetuates	  the	  inequities	  of	  the	  status	  quo.	  	  Academics	  first	  began	  to	  problematize	  international	  competition	  law	  in	  the	  early	  1990s.	  Specifically,	   a	   professor	   of	   law	   at	   the	   Max	   Planck	   Institute	   at	   Munich	   University,	  Wolfgang	  Fikentscher,	  headed	  a	  ‘Munich	  Group’	  that	  worked	  up	  its	  proposal	  into	  a	  draft	  international	  antitrust	  code	  presented	  to	  the	  director	  of	  the	  GATT	  in	  1993.	  In	  parallel	  to	  this	  intellectual	  enterprise	  the	  European	  Commissioner	  for	  competition	  (1989-­‐92)	  then	  for	   trade	   (1993-­‐99),	   Sir	   Leon	  Brittan,	   spearheaded	   an	   initiative,	   eventually	   backed	   by	  the	   Commission	   then	   the	   EU	   as	   a	   whole,	   to	   transpose	   many	   of	   the	   instruments	  developed	   to	  regulate	  competition	  within	   the	  EU	   into	  propositions	   for	  an	  extension	  of	  the	   WTO’s	   mandate.	   More	   precisely,	   Brittan,	   a	   lawyer	   and	   renowned	   neo-­‐liberal	  attracted	   to	   Chicago	   school	   thinking,	   considered	   that	   the	   problematization	   and	  instrumentation	  of	  competition	  policy	  that	  had	  proved	  so	  successful	  in	  relaunching	  DG	  COMP’s	  authority,	  could	  and	  should	  be	  used	  to	  tackle	  the	  ‘beyond	  the	  border’	  issues	  he	  considered	   were	   continuing	   to	   obstruct	   and	   harm	   free	   trade	   (Joana	   &	   Smith,	   2002).	  Within	  the	  Commission	  a	  working	  group	  on	  the	   issue	  was	  created	  which	  published	   its	  report	   in	   December	   1995.	   A	   year	   later,	   Brittan	   himself	   then	   presented	   formal	   EU	  proposals	   for	   adding	   competition	   policy	   to	   the	   mandate	   of	   the	   WTO	   at	   the	   latter’s	  ministerial	  meeting	  in	  Singapore.	  	  	  	  The	   immediate	  upshot	  of	   the	  proposals	  made	   in	  Singapore	  was	   the	  creation	  of	  a	  WTO	  working	   group	   on	   the	   interaction	   between	   trade	   and	   competition	   policy	   which,	   from	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1998	  to	  2001,	  then	  published	  a	  series	  of	  reports.	  These,	  together	  with	  work	  conducted	  in	   parallel	   by	   staff	   of	   the	   United	   Nations	   Conference	   on	   Trade	   and	   Development	  (UNCTAD),	  essentially	  sided	  with	  the	  EU	  proposal	  and	  saw	  it	  as	  positive	  for	  developing	  states.	   The	   reports	   then	   fed	   into	   draft	   proposals	   for	   a	   Multilateral	   Agreement	   on	  Competition	  Policy	  (MAC)	  that	  began	  to	  circulate	  amongst	  WTO	  member	  countries.	  The	  EU	   delegation	   immediately	   backed	   this	   proposal	   and	   were	   supported	   by	   the	  representatives	   of	   Japan,	   South	   Korea	   and	   Canada.	   More	   generally,	   widespread	  consensus	   then	   existed	   that	   a	   MAC	   would	   be	   particularly	   useful	   and	   legitimate	   in	  improving	   transparency	   over	   contentious	   competition	   cases,	   outlawing	   non-­‐discrimination	   between	   firms	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   nationality	   and	   prohibiting	   cartels.	  However,	   these	   consensual	   elements	   were	   quickly	   drowned	   out	   by	   two	   series	   of	  opponents.	  	  The	   first	  were	   dominant	   actors	  within	   competition	   regulation	   in	   the	  US.	  Not	   only	   did	  they	   see	   the	  MAC	   as	   unworkable	   in	   practice	   and	   liable	   to	   just	   create	   ‘bureaucracy’	   (a	  common	   charge	  made	   against	   international	   institutions	   by	   US	   representatives).	   More	  deeply	  still,	  the	  very	  logic	  of	  competition	  policy	  being	  proposed	  was	  denounced	  as	  being	  at	   odds	   with	   competition	   regulation	   in	   their	   own	   country.	   As	   Fox	   underlines,	   US	  antitrust	  policy	  itself	  is	  essentially	  ‘defensive’	  since	  its	  aim	  is	  ‘to	  prevent	  obstructive	  acts	  that	   harm	   consumers	   but	   not	   to	   create	   environments	   or	   duties	   that	  might	   help	   them’	  (2009:	  153).	  In	  other	  words,	  US	  competition	  policy	  is	  clearly	  dominated	  by	  the	  value	  of	  Freedom	  whereas	   that	   of	   the	  EU	   and	  many	   of	   its	  members	   tempers	   this	   commitment	  with	  another	   to	  Security.	  Given	  that	   the	  main	  aim	  of	   the	  MAC	  was	   indeed	  to	  create	  an	  ‘environment’	  within	  which	  the	  value	  of	  Security	  would	  have	  a	  role,	  US	  representatives	  were	  at	  best	  sceptical	  of	  the	  prospect	  of	  achieving	  global	  competition	  regulation.	  	  	  But	  US	  ambivalence	  about	  the	  MAC	  quickly	  paled	  into	  insignificance	  when	  compared	  to	  a	   second	   and	  more	   damaging	   type	   of	   opposition	   led	   by	   developing	   countries.	   Firstly,	  their	  representatives	  criticized	  the	  draft	  proposal	  as	  being	  excessively	  focused	  upon	  the	  WTO’s	  traditional	  mandate	  of	  guaranteeing	  market	  access.	  Rather	  than	  problematizing	  the	  MAC	   as	   a	  means	   of	   protecting	   international	   competition	   in	   trans-­‐border	  markets,	  and	   thus	   legitimizing	   competition	   as	   an	   international	   public	   good	   (Drexl,	   2004),	   the	  draft	  was	  seen	  as	  favouring	  the	  large	  companies	  of	  the	  global	  North.	  Secondly,	   like	  the	  US	  delegation,	  many	  representatives	  of	  developing	  states	  were	  concerned	  that	  during	  its	  implementation	   the	   MAC	   would	   give	   even	   greater	   powers	   to	   the	   WTO’s	   dispute	  settlement	  procedure,	  thereby	  undermining	  national	  competition	  regulators	  and	  courts.	  In	  so	  doing,	  they	  were	  particularly	  concerned	  that	  an	  overly	  rigid	  codification	  of	  the	  very	  principles	  of	   competition	  policy	  would	  be	  enshrined	  at	   a	   global	   scale,	   thus	  preventing	  developing	   states	   from	   engaging	   in	   any	   form	   of	   industrial	   policy.	   Finally,	   these	  opponents	  of	  the	  MAS	  considered	  that	  at	  least	  three	  issue	  areas	  of	  particular	  concern	  to	  them	  -­‐export	  cartels,	  anti-­‐dumping	  and	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights-­‐	  were	  largely	  absent	  from	   this	  draft	   agreement	   (Bhattacharjia,	   2006).	   In	   a	  nutshell,	   competition	  policy	  was	  delegitimized	  as	  a	  profound	  threat	  to	  national	  sovereignty.	  	  Led	  by	  delegations	  such	  as	   that	  of	   India,	  but	  also	   fuelled	  by	  many	  NGOs,	  opposition	  to	  the	  MAC	  came	  to	  a	  head	  in	  September	  2003,	  just	  before	  the	  WTO’s	  Ministerial	  meeting	  in	  Cancun.	  Moreover,	  given	   that	  WTO	  decision-­‐making	   is	   rarely	   just	   single	   issue	   focused,	  opponents	  of	  the	  MAC	  were	  able	  to	  take	  further	  strength	  from	  other	  politicized	  North-­‐South	  conflicts	  of	   that	  period,	   in	  particular	  over	   the	   trading	  of	  cotton.	  Ultimately,	  such	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actors	  insisted	  that,	  ‘competition	  policy	  is	  different	  from	  any	  other	  trade	  topic.	  It	  relates	  to	   the	   very	   philosophy	   of	   world	   trade	   law	   and,	   therefore,	   is	   of	   a	   quasi-­‐constitutional	  character’	  (Drexl,	  2004:	  456).	  	  It	   therefore	  came	  as	   little	  surprise	  when,	   in	   July	  2004,	   the	  MAC	  proposal	  was	   formally	  dropped	  by	   the	  WTO’s	  General	  Council.	   Ever	   since,	   official	   emphasis	  has	   instead	  been	  placed	  upon	   ‘improving’	  national	   competition	   regulators	  and	   the	  signature	  of	  bilateral	  agreements	  (eg.	  within	  trade	  agreements	  signed	  by	  the	  EU	  and	  individual	  states).	  More	  fundamentally,	   however,	   the	   global	   politics	   of	   competition	   regulation	   has	   been	  relaunched	   as	   a	   domain	   for	   experts	   in	   general	   and	   the	   International	   Competition	  Network	   (ICN)	   in	   particular.	   Founded	   in	   2001,	   largely	   at	   the	   initiative	   of	   the	  International	   Bar	   Association	   backed	   by	   the	   US	   government,	   the	   ICN	   brings	   together	  national	  competition	  regulatory	  agencies.	  Structured	  around	  working	  groups,	  an	  annual	  conference	   and	   a	   range	   of	   publications,	   this	   network	  now	   constitutes	   the	  main	   forum	  within	  which	  ‘best	  practice’	  is	  defined	  and	  from	  which	  ‘technical	  assistance’	  is	  given	  to	  developing	   countries	   (Fox,	   2009).	   In	   this	   way,	   and	   most	   obviously,	   the	   urgency	   and	  politicization	  that	  marked	  the	  period	  1996-­‐2003	  has	  been	  taken	  out	  of	   this	   issue	  area.	  This	  political	  work	  of	  technicization	  has	  been	  facilitated	  and	  legitimated	  by	  evocations	  of	   sovereignty	   as	   a	   value	   which,	   despite	   appearances	   to	   the	   contrary,	   actually	   stifles	  debate	  about	  how	  it	  should	  be	  hierarchized	  as	  regards	  genuine	  values	  such	  as	  Freedom,	  Security	  and	  Equality.	  Indeed,	  by	  naturalizing	  existing	  nation-­‐states	  through	  discourses	  and	   practices	   of	   ‘banal	   nationalism’	   (Billig,	   1995),	   and	   thus	   using	   sovereignty	   as	   a	  ‘pseudo-­‐value’,	   debate	   about	   the	   very	   principles	   behind	   competing	   visions	   of	  competition	  policy	  has	  been	  made	  particularly	  unlikely.	  	  On	   this	   deep	   level,	  what	   has	   also	   virtually	   disappeared	   is	   debate	   about	   the	   principles	  and	  application	  of	  competition	  policy	  in	  arenas	  whose	  legitimation	  is	  not	  as	  experts,	  but	  as	   guardians	   of	   ‘the	   general	   interest’.	   Of	   course,	   scrutiny	   of	   regulators	   who	   are	  ostensibly	   independent	   is	   not	  without	   its	   own	   problems.	   As	   Koviacic’s	  work	   (1982	  &	  1988)	  on	   the	   impact	  of	   the	  US	  congress	  on	   the	  Federal	  Trade	  Commission	  underlines,	  legislatures	   and	   legislative	   committees	   can	   also	   be	   deeply	   biased	   over,	   or	   feature	  fluctuating	  approaches	  to,	  competition	  policy.	  Moreover,	  one	  should	  also	  recall	  that	  such	  scrutiny	   is	  not	  even	  attempted	   in	  the	  EU	  where	  the	  European	  Parliament	  has	  virtually	  no	   say	   over	   the	   orientation	   and	   application	   of	   competition	   policy	   by	   the	   Commission.	  Indeed,	   as	  with	  other	  areas	  of	   economic	   life	   such	  as	   central	  banking	   in	  Europe,	   in	   the	  name	   of	   ‘independence’	   competition	   policy	   has	   repeatedly	   been	   technicized	   and	  depoliticised.	   As	   Vauchez	   underlines,	   however,	   this	   absolutely	   does	   not	   signify	   that	  ‘independent’	  agencies	  are	  not	  political.	  What	   it	  means	   instead	   is	   that	  researchers	  and	  actors	  alike	  all	  need	  to	  overcome	  the	  fact	  that	  having	  been	  brought	  up	  under	  the	  ideals	  of	  parliamentary	  democracy,	  we	  are	  ‘intellectually	  under-­‐equipped’	  to	  grasp	  and	  engage	  with	  the	  politics	  within	  which	  these	  agencies	  are	  now	  centrally	  important	  (2014:	  10).	  	  	  
Conclusion	  	  As	   Vauchez	   also	   underlines	   (2014:	   35),	   we	   needed	   to	   retrain	   our	   way	   of	   looking	   at	  politics	  in	  general,	  and	  its	  role	  in	  economic	  activity	  in	  particular.	  The	  constructivist	  and	  institutionalist	  approach	  tested	  once	  again	  in	  this	  chapter	  provides	  a	  means	  of	  doing	  so	  by	   rejecting	   images	   and	   implicit	   ontologies	   of	   economics	   as	   ‘messy’,	   ‘anarchic’	   and	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outside	  politics.	  On	   the	  contrary,	  as	   these	  examples	   from	  the	  worlds	  of	  medicines	  and	  inter-­‐firm	  competition	  have	  sought	  to	  highlight,	  this	  approach	  firstly	  guides	  research	  to	  discovering	  the	  institutions	  and	  other	  socio-­‐political	  constructions	  which	  structure	  and	  shape	   economic	   activity.	   Secondly,	   it	   encourages	   identification	   of	   the	   political	   work,	  itself	   rooted	   in	  confrontations	  of	  values,	  which	  has	  been	  their	  cause.	  To	  underline	   just	  one	   of	   the	   lessons	   that	   comparing	   the	   governing	   of	   pharmaceutical	   and	   competition	  from	  this	  angle	   reveals,	  national	   sovereignty	  has	  clearly	  been	  accorded	   the	  status	  of	  a	  value	   in	   both	   cases.	  However,	   rather	   than	   this	   having	   been	   inevitable	   or	   ‘natural’,	  my	  analytical	  framework	  has	  begun	  to	  show	  how	  this	  construction	  and	  legitimation	  of	  social	  reality	   has	   come	   about,	   been	   perpetuated	   and	   had	   considerable	   socioeconomic	   and	  political	  consequences.	  	  These	  points	  take	  on	  particular	  importance	  when	  one	  seeks	  to	  discover	  whether	  the	  EU	  makes	  a	  difference	  to	  the	  politics	  of	  economic	  activity.	  Research	  is	  right	  to	  highlight	  its	  findings	   that,	  at	   least	   since	   the	  mid-­‐1990s,	  a	  discourse	   that	   the	  EU	  possesses	  a	   ‘social’	  approach	  to	  economic	  policy	  has	  become	  increasingly	  empty.	  Similarly,	  there	  is	  less	  and	  less	  evidence	  that	   the	  EU	   is	  either	  a	  rampart	  against	   the	  effects	  of	  a	   liberalizing	  world	  trade	   or	   a	   leader	   in	   the	  making	   of	   global	   institutions	   and	   organizations.	   This	   said,	   by	  focusing	  upon	  the	  value-­‐driven	  decisions	  made	  over	  economic	  policies	  of	  varying	  types,	  one	  can	  and	  should	  also	  stress	  that	  there	  has	  been	  nothing	  inevitable	  about	  these	  trends	  emerging,	   nor	   anything	   inevitable	   about	   them	   continuing	   in	   the	   future.	   Politics	   as	   the	  mobilization	  of	  values	  has	  produced	  the	  EU	  of	  today,	  just	  as	  recasting	  this	  politics	  could	  redirect	  the	  European	  government	  of	  economic	  activity	  towards	  new	  goals	  in	  the	  years	  to	  come.	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